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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three chapters that study the behavior of economies where
trade in both labor and goods market is subject to search frictions. It analyzes the
interactions between frictional labor and goods markets and examines technology and
preference shocks as alternative sources of business cycle fluctuations in unemployment,
hours worked and inventories.
In Chapter 1, the focus is on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with Nash
wage bargaining. This model provides a qualitatively appealing theory of unemploy-
ment, but its ability to explain the observed magnitude of fluctuations in unemployment
remains debated. I add goods market frictions to this model, and show that they affect
workers’ bargaining position, provide a rationale for a high value of non-market activity
and also affect its cyclical properties. These frictions can thus amplify the response
of unemployment and vacancies to changes in the measured labor productivity caused
by either technology or preference shocks. The response of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio in the extended model is about twice as large as in the model with labor search
only if either (1) goods and search effort are substitutes in the goods market matching
function and fluctuations are a result of a technology shocks, or (2) when goods and
search effort are complements in the goods market matching function and the driving
force of fluctuations are preference shocks. Finally, I show that if preferences are addi-
tively separable and goods market matching function has unit elasticity of substitution,
preference and technology shocks are observationally equivalent and can not be sepa-
rately identified by an economist who would analyze data on labor productivity, output,
employment and wages.
Chapter 2 shows that introducing goods market frictions into an otherwise standard
model provides a simple but attractive framework to analyze the behavior of invento-
ries over the business cycle. It also shows that the behavior of sales and inventories
over the business cycle contains information that allows to identify the contribution of
technology and preference shocks to fluctuations in unemployment. I employ Bayesian
methods to estimate a model with goods and labor search frictions using U.S. data
on labor productivity and inventory-sales ratio, and find that the implied response of
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vacancies and unemployment to changes in measured labor productivity is about twice
as large as in the model with labor search only. Goods market frictions also allow the
model to account for the main facts on inventories - procyclical inventory investment,
countercyclical inventories-sales ratio, and sales which are more volatile than produc-
tion.
In Chapter 3, I examine another shortcoming of the labor search model identified
by Shimer (2010) and related to the so called labor wedge - the gap between the firm’s
marginal product of labor and the household’s marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. I show that under the business cycle accounting approach
proposed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) goods market frictions in the model
manifest themselves as a labor wedge: In an expansion, firms find it easier to sell
goods, and consumers benefit from higher availability of goods and smaller disutility
from search effort required per unit of consumption purchased; this encourages larger
response of the intensive margin of labor supply than in the standard frictionless model.
It thus also alleviates the issue arising in model with frictional labor markets, where
search frictions act as adjustment costs, and thus result in a labor wedge that resembles
a counterfactually procyclical tax on labor income.
iii
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Chapter 1
Amplification of Shocks in a
Model with Goods and Labor
Search
1.1 Introduction
It is widely accepted that heterogeneities and information imperfections make trade
in the labor market a decentralized, time consuming and costly activity for firms and
workers. Similar complications arise with trade in the goods market. With heterogeneity
in characteristics of goods and services, and with costly acquisition of information,
consumers have to spend resources to find the goods and services that match their
needs and preferences, and to obtain information about their availability at different
locations. But while the literature studying departures from the Walrasian labor market
by imposing search frictions is quite large (see Pissarides, 2000 for introduction to the
literature, and Rogerson, Shimer, & Wright, 2005 for a survey), similar analysis for the
goods market is less common.
The aim of this paper is to study how unemployment dynamics is affected by effects
that arise from interactions of frictional labor and goods markets. To that end, I
extend the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides labor search-matching model by
introducing a goods market search-matching friction, and use it to address two issues.
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2First, the response of unemployment to changes in labor productivity in the basic labor
search model is much smaller than in U.S. data; I show that feedback effects between
labor market and goods market can result in amplification of shocks in the extended
model. Higher employment increases output which can encourage consumers to increase
their search for consumption goods; higher search effort by consumers increases profits of
firms and thus affects firms’ hiring decisions. Moreover, when wages are determined by
Nash bargaining, there is an additional effect through the wage channel. In the extended
model, goods market frictions affect worker’s bargaining position, provide rationale for
high value of non-market activity, but also change cyclical properties of the value of non-
market activity. This effect arises since higher availability of goods in expansions makes
frictions in the goods market less severe from consumer’s perspective, thus increasing the
value of additional earnings obtained when the worker accepts the job. This results in a
downward pressure on worker’s outside option in the Nash bargaining and consequently
increases incentives for firms to hire new workers.
Second, I examine the driving forces behind unemployment fluctuations, and in ad-
dition to technology (supply side) shocks also consider preference (demand side) shocks,
that give rise to movements in measured labor productivity similar to those caused by
technology shocks. In the model with goods market frictions, a demand shock that
increases the search effort by consumers also increases output and measured labor pro-
ductivity. These shocks can therefore provide an alternative explanation of fluctuations
in unemployment over the business cycle. I show that to an economist who would use
only the time series usually considered in labor search literature - labor productivity,
output, employment, vacancies and wages - preference and technology shocks are ob-
servationally equivalent if utility is additively separable and at the same time goods
market matching function has unit elasticity of substitution. This means that based on
these time series it is impossible to distinguish the case with actual shocks to technology
from the case where the true productivity is constant, and changes in measured average
labor productivity, output and employment are the result of changes in preferences and
demand.
I first explore the qualitative properties of the model, analyze conditions under which
technology and preference shocks can be distinguished, and under which goods market
frictions amplify effects of shocks. After that, I estimate the model using likelihood
3based Bayesian methods; this approach is used since in the presence of goods market
frictions measured labor productivity becomes endogenous and does not coincide with
actual unobserved productivity. The model is estimated with one shock at a time, to
match only the time series for U.S. average labor productivity. When search effort
and output supplied by firms are good substitutes, a modest amount of goods market
frictions increases the response of vacancy-unemployment ratio to technology shocks by
one third. And with low substitutability between search effort and output supplied by
firms, shocks to preferences result in response of vacancy-unemployment ratio which is
about two and half times larger than the response to technology shocks in model with
labor search only.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After the review of related literature,
the model is described in Section 1.2, next, equilibrium is characterized and its qualita-
tive properties are examined in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4 I use Bayesian estimation of
a weekly model matching the U.S. labor productivity to parametrize alternative shocks,
and then compare the implied business cycle properties of unemployment, vacancies
and the labor market tightness. Section 1.5 concludes. Most of the algebra used to
derive the characterization of equilibrium, as well as all the proofs are delegated to the
appendices.
Related Literature
The ability of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model of the
labor market (Diamond, 1982, Pissarides, 1985, Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994, and
also Pissarides, 2000 for textbook exposition) to amplify and propagate the technology
shocks and the extent to which model generated business cycles statistics match the
U.S. data have been widely discussed. Shimer (2005) argues that the basic model
calibrated to U.S. data can not generate enough volatility in unemployment, vacancies
and in labor market tightness: while surplus of a match increases in expansions, under
Nash bargaining wages absorb most of this increase, leaving firms with little incentives
to hire new workers. Several papers thus examined different examined wage rigidity
(Shimer, 2005, Hall, 2005) and alternative wage bargaining process (Hall & Milgrom,
2008, Mortensen & Nagypal, 2007) as a ways to improve the performance of the model.
The wage rigidity required is that wages of workers in new employment relationships
4are rigid over the business cycle. Given that the empirical evidence available does not
support this claim (see Pissarides, 2009 for a detailed discussion), this solutions is not
completely without its own problems.
After investigating the puzzle more closely, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) have
proposed an alternative way to calibrate the two key parameters - worker’s bargaining
power and the value of the non-market activity - and were able to obtain fluctuations
of the right magnitude. However, as shown in Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005)
and Costain and Reiter (2008), with this alternative calibration the response of unem-
ployment to changes in unemployment compensation in the model is implausibly large.
Several other papers examined modifications of the basic labor search model to see if
they improve its quantitative properties; these include among others labor turnover costs
(Mortensen & Nagypal, 2007, Pissarides, 2009, Silva & Toledo, 2013), asymmetric infor-
mation (Guerrieri, 2008, Moen & Rose´n, 2011), endogenous home production (Garin &
Lester, 2013), and introduction of on-the-job search (Krause & Lubik, 2010, Menzio &
Shi, 2011). In all these papers changes in productivity as a result of technology shocks
remain the driving source of business cycle fluctuations.
A promising alternative to technology shocks was proposed by Bai, R´ıos-Rull, and
Storesletten (2012). These authors show that once goods market frictions are incor-
porated into a traditional RBC model with frictionless labor market, preference shocks
generate movements in Solow residual similar to those caused by technology shocks, and
also perform well in matching co-movements of main macroeconomic variables. Their
results thus motivate to consider preference shocks as an alternative to the technol-
ogy shocks in the model with labor search. But since labor market is frictionless in
their model, the results of interaction of frictions in labor and goods markets are not
investigated in their paper.
There are a few papers that lately started to analyze the interactions of search fric-
tions in labor and goods markets. Lehmann and Van der Linden (2010) investigate
the link between inflation and unemployment in a modified labor search model where
products are sold in frictional market with demand given by real money holdings of
consumers. Kaplan and Menzio (2013) develop a model where shopping externalities
lead to multiplicity of equilibria, and where shocks to agents’ expectations about future
5unemployment create self-fulfilling fluctuations even in absence of any shocks to tech-
nology or preferences. Huo and R´ıos-Rull (2013) develop a neoclassical growth model
with tradable and nontradable sector, frictions in goods and labor markets, and with
adjustment costs in both physical investment and hiring of new employees. Goods mar-
ket search frictions exist at the level of varieties household consumes rather than firms’
locations as in Bai et al. (2012), search effort is a complement rather than a substitute
for the resources spent, and preferences with no wealth effects guarantee that varieties
of nontradable goods are a normal good. The paper analyzes the effects of wealth and
financial shocks instead of traditionally considered shocks to total factor productivity,
and show how the increased desire to save by consumers can induce a recession rather
than a boom. This recession arises due to the adjustment cost and labor market fric-
tions; goods market frictions are important quantitatively and amplify the recession.
The focus of my paper is different, I examine technology and the preference shocks as
alternative source of business cycle fluctuations in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
model with goods market frictions, and study the channels through which search fric-
tions in the goods market amplify the response of unemployment to changes in measured
labor productivity.
The two papers that are probably closest to mine are Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer
(2011) and Michaillat and Saez (2013). Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2011) consider
the standard technology shocks only, and show that in a model with search in credit,
labor and goods markets technology shocks are both significantly amplified and propa-
gated by goods market frictions. Their framework is different from the one this paper.
Firms and consumers in the goods market form long term matches and price for which
output is sold in these matches is determined by bilateral Nash bargaining. Matching
frictions in the good market in their model introduce a delay in the reaction of unem-
ployment to technology shocks through firms’ response to the evolution of price and
congestion in the goods market, but with linear preferences and a simple wage setting
rule their approach misses the effects of goods market frictions on outside option of the
worker in the wage bargaining process. Moreover, the fact that the technology shock
process is parameterized the same way in their models with and without goods market
frictions implies that the properties of the measured labor productivity will be different
in these models.
6The paper by Michaillat and Saez (2013) analyzes the role of demand and supply
shocks in shaping the aggregate demand and employment when labor and goods markets
are subject to search frictions. In addition, they study the size of the government
purchase multiplier and effects of redistributional transfers and changes in minimum
wage on output and employment. The focus of their paper is however on theoretical
analysis of the short run, and the model they develop is static, with prices that are fixed.
If prices and wages were instead determined by Nash bargaining, demand shocks would
have no effect on labor market tightness. In contrast, prices in my model are flexible,
amplification effects are not driven by price or wage rigidities, and demand shocks play
an important role in explaining fluctuations in vacancies and unemployment.
1.2 Model
There is a measure one of households, each with measure one of infinitely lived workers.
Workers have to search for jobs in the labor market, and search for consumption goods
in the goods market. Household pools resources and provides its members insurance
against fluctuations that arise due to the uncertain results of search. Preferences are
subject to shocks affecting the marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutilities
from work and search. These shocks are perfectly correlated across all workers in the
economy.
There is also a continuum of firms with measure one which use labor as the only
input to produce goods. Goods are sold in market that is subject to search frictions,
firms post prices and consumers direct their search effort to acquire goods at a particular
price. I assume that workers cannot quit but there is exogenous job destruction. Firms
need to open and maintain vacancies to hire new workers. For labor market I employ
standard undirected search mechanism with Nash bargaining.
The aggregate state of the economy is S = (z, ζ,N), where N is the measure of
employed workers after separations take place and (z, ζ) are the exogenous shocks with
z being the current technology, ζ the current preference shock. I assume that shocks
(z, ζ) follow first order Markov process.
Time is discrete and the timing of events within the period is as follows: (1) shocks
are realized; exogenous job separations occur; (2) each firm decides simultaneously how
7many vacancies to open and the price for which to sell goods; (3) employed workers
produce, unemployed workers search for a job, search and matching in the goods and
labor markets takes place; (4) payments are made (goods purchases, dividends, wages);
(5) household pools resources and goods purchased, consumption takes place.
Labor Market
As in the basic labor search-matching model in Pissarides (2000), only unemployed
workers search for jobs, search is not directed, and the number of matches of unemployed
workers U and vacancies V is given by an aggregate constant returns to scale matching
function mL(U, V ). Let θ = VU denote the tightness of the market, pi
u(θ) = mL(1, θ) the
probability for an unemployed worker to be hired, and piv(θ) = mL(1/θ, 1) the measure
of workers that one vacancy attracts.
I assume that workers value their actions based on the contribution they bring to
the utility of the household; worker’s surplus from being employed is thus the change in
the household’s utility from having one additional member employed. When a worker
and a vacancy are matched, and the worker accepts the job, wage w is set in every
period as a solution to the asymmetric Nash bargaining problem1
w(S) = argmax
wˆ
Wˆn(wˆ)
µΩˆn(wˆ)
1−µ (1.2.1)
where Wˆn(wˆ) and Ωˆn(wˆ) are the household’s and firm’s value of a marginal worker
employed and earning arbitrary wage wˆ in the current period and equilibrium wage w
thereafter, until the job is hit by the separation shock δ.
Goods Market
Acquisition of consumption goods requires active search effort on the side of the
consumer to find the goods to purchase. To model these frictions in the goods market
I adopt the competitive search mechanism proposed by Moen (1997) - firms post prices
and consumers direct their search effort to acquire goods at a particular price. Goods
market is thus divided into submarkets, and firm and household’s members can choose in
which submarket to trade. The amount of goods sold in any submarket is determined by
1 The timing of payments is however not crucial. Even if wages are constant throughout the duration
of employment, as long as at the time when a match is formed the surplus is split according to the Nash
bargaining, firms’ decisions about hiring are unaffected. Equilibrium allocation is then same as in the
case with period by period Nash bargaining.
8a matching function mG(D,TX). Here D is the aggregate search effort of all consumers
in the particular submarket, T the measure of firms selling in the particular submarket
and X is the quantity of goods sold per firm in the submarket.
Assumption 1. Goods market matching function mG(D,TX) is constant return to
scale, with elasticity of substitution σ.
Submarkets are indexed by (p,Q) where p is the price of the consumption good and
Q = TD is the tightness of the submarket. Since m
G has constant returns to scale, the
amount of goods acquired per unit of search effort by household’s shopper is
ψd(Q,X) = mG(1, QX)
and the probability that a particular unit of good is sold is
ψx(Q,X) = mG
( 1
QX
, 1
)
Consequently, the amount of output successfully sold by a firm supplying x in submarket
(p,Q), where the total amount of goods supplied by all firms is TX is
xψx(Q,X) =
x
X
ψd(Q,X)
Q
The matching process is thus different from the one in Bai et al. (2012). Here, ceteris
paribus, an increase in the total supply of goods in the submarket affects the probability
that a particular unit of consumption good is sold, whereas in their paper that probabil-
ity is unaffected. This modified assumption seems intuitive, and as discussed in Section
1.3 it allows to identify the relative importance of technology and preference shocks.
In addition, efficiency in Bai et al. (2012) requires stronger assumption on information
available to consumers - equilibrium in is guaranteed to be efficient only if submarket
are indexed by price, tightness and also quantity sold; as shown below, only price and
tightness are needed in my model.
9Households
As in Merz (1995), I consider households to be extended families consisting of a
measure one of workers. All workers are ex-ante identical and their preferences are
given by
E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, dt, et, ζt)
where ct is consumption, dt search effort in goods market, et is the employment status
and ζt = (ζct, ζdt, ζnt) is the preference shock affecting the marginal utility of consump-
tion, marginal disutility of search for consumption good and the disutility of work.
Households own firms, and in the recursive formulation of the household’s problem,
the individual state of a household, s = (a, n), is given by wealth in the form of shares a,
and the number of members of the household that have a job after separations take place
n. Household decides about goods market search effort of its employed and unemployed
workers dn, du, consumption allocation cn, cu, and about share holdings for next period
a′. Each member also decides in which submarket (p,Q) to search for consumption
goods, and directs the search to the submarket that delivers the biggest contribution to
the utility of the household. I incorporate this through a constraint in the problem of a
firm which posts price and decides about quantity sold. In addition, since in equilibrium
only one market is going to be active, in the household’s problem price of goods, goods
market tightness and quantity sold appear as given functions of state p(S), Q(S), X(S).
Taking prices p(S), w(S), R(S) as given, the household then faces a budget constraint
p(S)
(
ncn + (1− n)cu)+ a′ = (1 +R(S))a+ w(S)n
with shares acting as a numeraire. In addition, search frictions in goods market impose
a constraint
ncn + (1− n)cu = (ndn + (1− n)du)ψd(Q(S), X(S))
where ψd(Q,X) is the amount of goods acquired per unit of search effort in the goods
markets, and the search frictions in labor market constraint
n′ = (1− δ)n+ piu(θ(S))(1− n)
where piu(θ) is the probability for an individual to find a job. Since the optimal allocation
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of consumption and search effort among family members in each period solves
U(c, d, n, ζ) = max
cn,cu,dn,du
nu(cn, dn, 1, ζ) + (1− n)u(cu, du, 0, ζ)
subject to
ncn + (1− n)cu = c
ndn + (1− n)du = d
where c is the total amount of consumption goods available to household and d is the
overall search effort, I can formally set up the household’s problem in which it acts as if
it had preferences with utility function U(c, d, n, ζ). To summarize, household’s problem
written in a recursive form is
W (s; S) = max
c,d,a′
U(c, d, n, ζ) + βEW (s′; S′) (1.2.2)
subject to
p(S)c+ a′ = (1 +R(S))a+ w(S)n
c = dψd(Q(S), X(S))
n′ = (1− δ)n+ piu(θ(S))(1− n)
S′ = G(S)
Firms
The individual state of a firm is the number of workers employed n. Each firm
chooses in which submarket (p,Q) to sell the goods and at the same time decides how
many vacancies v to open. The amount of goods x that the firm can potentially sell is
given by
x = zf(n− χv)− κ(v)
with fl > 0, fll ≤ 0 and κv ≥ 0, κvv ≥ 0 which can be interpreted as a case where
some of the workers act as recruiters and thus χv hours of worked are diverted from the
production process to hiring, and in addition κ(v) costs in terms of goods are incurred
for vacancy posting. This specification of the hiring process nests Shimer (2010) as a
special case where f(l) = l, χ = 1 and κ(v) ≡ 0, and the benchmark case from Pissarides
(2000) if f(l) = l, χ = 0 and κ(v) ≡ κ. Each vacancy attracts piv(θ) new workers. If the
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firm decides to sell its output x in the (p,Q) submarket, where the aggregate amount
of goods being sold is X, then the actual amount of goods sold is given by
xψx(Q,X) =
x
X
ψd(Q,X)
Q
Goods which are not sold can not be stored, as in Bai et al. (2012) and Petrosky-Nadeau
and Wasmer (2011). As discussed above, the firm needs to take into account a constraint
which guarantees shoppers in the (p,Q) submarket equilibrium value of search W ∗d (S).
Let M(S) be the marginal value of wealth in terms of utility, then
Wd(S) = Ud(S) + (Uc(S)− pM(S))ψd(Q,X)
is the value to the household of the marginal search effort in the (p,Q) submarket.
Finally, let m(S,S′) be the stochastic discount factor used to discount future profits.
To summarize, the problem that a firm solves is then
Ω(n; S) = max
v,p,Q,x
{
pψx(Q,X)x− w(S)n+ E[m(S,S′)Ω(n′; S′)]} (1.2.3)
subject to
x = zf(n− χv)− κ(v)
n′ = (1− δ)n+ piv(θ(S))v
W ∗d (S) = Ud(S) + (Uc(S)− pM(S))ψd(Q,X)
S′ = G(S)
Equilibrium
Definition 1. Equilibrium is household’s value function and decision rules (W, gc, gd, ga
′
)
as functions of (s; S); value function and decision rules (Ω, gv, gp) as functions of (n; S);
aggregate allocation (X,C,D, V ), tightness (Q, θ), prices (p, w), dividends R, law of mo-
tion for employment GN , all as functions of S; such that
1. Value function W solves (1.2.2) and (gc, gd, gs
′
) are the associated policy functions
2. Value function Ω solves (1.2.3) and (gv, gp) are the associated policy functions
3. Household and firm are representative
4. Wage w solves the Nash bargaining problem (1.2.1)
5. Goods market tightness is Q(S) = 1D(S) ; labor market tightness θ(S) =
V (S)
1−N
6. Law of motion for employment is implied by firm’s policy.
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1.3 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section I analyze the qualitative properties of the model economy, role of technol-
ogy and preference shocks, and the interactions of frictions in labor market and goods
markets. I start by deriving two functional equations that characterize the dynamics
of market tightnesses Q(S) and θ(S). These are obtained by first deriving the opti-
mality conditions for the household and the firm, and then using them to obtain the
solution for the Nash bargaining problem in the labor market, and competitive search
problem in the goods market. Details can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B,
here I summarize the results. To avoid the notational clutter in what follows I drop
the arguments of functions, use gA to denote derivative of function g with respect to A,
and g′ to denote value of function g in the next period. Thus for example in equation
(1.3.1) below Uc and Ud stand for
∂
∂cU(C(S), D(S), N) and
∂
∂dU(C(S), D(S), N), ψ
d for
ψd(Q(S), X(S)). I also use notation AB for elasticity of A with respect to B.
The goods market with competitive search gives rise to the following intratemporal
condition
− Ud = (1− ψ
d
Q )ψ
dUc (1.3.1)
where ψ
d
Q =
∂ logψd
∂ logQ .
The labor market behavior is characterized by the following condition, which is the
counterpart of the stochastic first order difference equation for market tightness θ in the
basic Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search matching model
1
piv
(χzfl + κv)ψ
x
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
= βE
[(
(1− µ)z′f ′l +
(1− δ
(piv)′
− µθ′
)
(χz′f ′l + κ
′
v)
)
(ψx)′
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)
+ (1− µ)U ′n
]
(1.3.2)
Notice that using
C = ψx(Q,X)X
D = 1/Q
X = zf(N − χV )− κ(V )
V = θ(1−N)
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equations (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) can be written in terms of current and next period’s
(Q, θ,N) and shocks z, ζ only; thus together with the law of motion for labor
N ′ = (1− δ)N + piu(θ)(1−N) (1.3.3)
they fully characterize the dynamics of (Q, θ,N) in equilibrium.
Note also that the measured average labor productivity in this economy is
y =
ψxX
N
(1.3.4)
and that it is affected by technology shock z, the discrepancy between the number of
workers N and the number of workers in production L = N − χV , and the size of the
goods market frictions. In the presence of goods market frictions preference shocks ζc
and ζd have an effect on measured average labor productivity y through their effect on
both ψx and X. This serves as a motivation in Section 1.4, where I use Bayesian methods
to estimate the model and parametrize processes for shocks ζc and ζd by matching the
labor productivity y the model to the labor productivity observed in U.S. data.
1.3.1 Efficiency
The efficient allocation is defined as an allocation chosen by a social planner facing the
same search-matching frictions as the participants in the labor and goods markets in
the decentralized economy.
Definition 2. An allocation is efficient if it solves
W(z, ζ,N) = max
C,D,X,V
{
U(C,D,N, ζ) + βEW(z′, ζ ′, N ′)}
subject to
C = mG(D,TX)
X = zf(N − χV )− κ(V )
N ′ = (1− δ)N +mL(1−N,V )
Given this definition, the following proposition gives the condition under which the
equilibrium of the decentralized economy in this paper is efficient.
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Proposition 1 (Efficiency). If µ = m
L
U equilibrium is efficient.
Thus even with search frictions in the goods market, when this search is competi-
tive and submarkets are indexed by price and market tightness, familiar condition from
Hosios (1990) continues to hold, and equilibrium is efficient as long as workers’ bargain-
ing power is equal to the elasticity of labor market matching function with respect to
unemployment.
1.3.2 The Role of Goods Market Frictions
The channel through which changes in goods market conditions affect the labor market
manifests itself in equation (1.3.2) by the terms ψx and Ud
ψd
that affect the cost of hiring
an extra worker on the left hand side of equation (1.3.2), and terms (ψx)′ and U
′
d
(ψd)′
that affect the benefits of hiring this worker on the right hand side of equation (1.3.2).
An increase in the expected probability to successfully sell goods (ψx)′, or a decrease
in the disutility from search for goods
U ′d
(ψd)′ raises future benefits of having an extra
worker employed in the similar way as an increase in technology z′. Going back one
step, the reason why the new terms appear in the labor market condition (1.3.2) is that
the presence of search frictions in the goods market changes the surplus of the match
between a worker and a firm and affects the wage bargaining process. As a result, as
shown in Appendix B, with Nash bargaining real wage in equilibrium is
w
p
= µψx(zfl + θ(χzfl + κv))− (1− µ) Un
Uc +
Ud
ψd
(1.3.5)
Similarly to other search-matching models with Nash bargaining, wage is a weighted
average of the value of marginal product of a worker enhanced by the vacancy cost sav-
ings, and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Compared
to a standard model without goods market search, there are however two important dif-
ferences. First, the value of the marginal product of a worker and the marginal cost
of vacancy per worker are multiplied by ψx which captures the fact that only a share
of goods are actually successfully sold. Second, marginal utility foregone by switching
from non-market activity to market activity −Un is evaluated in terms of consumption
goods using Uc +
Ud
ψd
rather than Uc, where
Ud
ψd
captures the disutility from search for
consumption good that is needed to be able to spend the extra earned income. This last
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fact provides rationale for a high value of non-market activity proposed by Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008), as a way to generate fluctuations in labor market tightness in
the standard labor search model that would be comparable to those in the data.
Consider now the effects of a positive technology shock z in the economy with
goods market frictions. There are several additional channels that affect the wage
and the hiring decision of a firm. Since output supplied X increases, the return from
search increases for consumers too. Thus, for preferences where the substitution effect
dominates the income effect, search effort increases and goods market tightness falls;
as a result firms are more likely to sell the goods, which amplifies the impact of initial
increase in productivity on return to production. In addition, higher output supplied X
and lower goods market tightness Q have opposing effects on disutility from search effort
required to purchase the marginal unit of consumption, and thus also on the bargaining
position of the worker, wage, and the hiring decision of a firm.
The effects of different shocks can be characterized further if additional assumptions
are imposed on preferences and technology. I analyze the behavior of model economy
under the assumption of standard separable preferences, and for comparison also under
the alternative assumption of preferences for which there is no income effect on search
effort.
Assumption 1A. Utility function of worker is u(c, d, e, ζ) = ζcu(c)− ζdg(d)− ζne with
relative risk aversion coefficient η = − cu′′(c)u′(c) .
Assumption 1B. Utility function of worker is u(c, d, e, ζ) = ζcu
(
c− ζdg(d)
)− ζne.
Assumption 2. Vacancy costs are κ(v) = zκ¯(v) for some κ¯(v) with dκ¯dz = 0.
Under Assumptions 1A and 2, if in addition the goods market matching function
mG has elasticity of substitution σ = 1, then preference shocks in this model are in a
sense observationally equivalent to technology shocks. That is, a process for technology
shock z that generates a particular observed history of average labor productivity y can
be replaced by constant technology z and some process for preference shock ζd that
generates same history y. In addition, observed histories for vacancies, employment,
output and wages are also identical. Thus technology shock z and preference shocks
ζd generate same co-movements of measured labor productivity y and labor market
tightness θ.
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Proposition 2 (Equivalence of preference and technology shocks).
Under Assumptions 1A and 2
a. iff goods market matching function mG has elasticity of substitution σ = 1, then for
any history of shocks (zt, ζt) and resulting history of average labor productivity, market
tightness and employment (yt, θt, Qt, N t) which satisfy (1.3.1)-(1.3.4), there exist a his-
tory (z˜t, ζ˜t) and Q˜t, with z˜t = 1, ζ˜ct = ζct, ζ˜nt = ζnt, such that ((z˜
t, ζ˜t), (yt, θt, Q˜t, N t))
also satisfy (1.3.1)-(1.3.4).
b. histories of real wages (wp )
t and ( w˜p˜ )
t associated with (z˜t, ζ˜t) and (z˜t, ζ˜t) are identical
if and only if goods market matching function mG has elasticity of substitution σ = 1.
This result has implications for the quantitative analysis: assuming additively sep-
arable preferences, Cobb-Douglas goods market matching function and vacancy costs
proportional to z implies that the two types of shocks can be distinguished, and their
contribution to business cycle fluctuations analyzed only if some data on sales relative
to the total supply of output in the market is utilized. To an economist who would use
only the time series usually considered in labor search literature - labor productivity,
output, employment, vacancies and wages - preference and technology shocks are obser-
vationally equivalent, it is impossible to distinguish the case with shocks to technology
from the case where the actual technology is constant, and changes in measured average
labor productivity, output and employment are the results of changes in preferences and
demand.
The next proposition establishes a neutrality result for the case where utility function
is logarithmic in consumption.
Proposition 3 (Neutrality of shocks).
Under Assumption 1A if in addition η = 1 and σ = 1
a. technology shocks z have no effect on the goods market tightness Q
b. preference shocks ζd have no effect on the labor market tightness θ
Under Assumptions 1A and 2, if in addition η = 1 and σ = 1
c. technology shocks z have no effect on the labor market tightness θ
In Proposition 3, labor market tightness θ becomes independent of {z, ζd} and de-
pends on {ζc, ζn} only; goods market tightness Q becomes completely independent of
technology z and the behavior of θ in the labor market, and depends on {ζc, ζd} only.
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The reason for the neutrality result of the goods market with respect to technology
z is that the income and substitution effects for search effort in the goods market cancel:
For a given level of employment, improvement in technology z results in higher amount
of output X supplied by firms and hence allows agents to consume more even if they
decrease their search effort, while the substitution effect motivates greater search effort;
and if η = 1 these two effects exactly offset each other. Then, since the search effort is
constant so is the goods market tightness and the probability of selling the good. Note
that this holds for any form of vacancy cost κ(v), Assumption 2 is not necessary for
part a. of the Proposition 3 .
The neutrality of labor market tightness with respect to productivity in the labor
search model with additively separable logarithmic utility function and with vacancy
costs proportional to z is discussed in Shimer (2010), who emphasizes that it holds for
any bargaining power of the worker, and any value of non-market activity (leisure) in his
model. As we can see, this result holds even in the model with labor and goods search,
for any amount of frictions in the goods market. That is, it holds for specification of
goods matching function as long as mG has elasticity of substitution σ = 1. Moreover,
labor market tightness θ in this model is also neutral with respect to preference shocks
ζd. Note that this holds for any form of vacancy cost κ(v) since Assumption 2 is
not necessary for claim b. of the Proposition 3. Thus the neutrality of labor market
tightness with respect to preference shock ζd is even stronger than the one with respect
to technology shocks z, which requires that hiring costs χzfl +κv are proportional to z.
Comparative Statics
To get more insight how changes in preferences and technology work through the model,
it is helpful to undertake the comparative statics analysis before proceeding to the quan-
titative analysis of the business cycle properties of the model. As argued in Mortensen
and Nagypal (2007) and Pissarides (2009), since measured labor productivity changes
are rather persistent and labor market flows are large, the approximation of dynamics
of the DMP model by its steady state elasticities is reasonably accurate.
Changes in Technology
Since actual technology z is not directly observable, and only measured average la-
bor productivity y is observed, the relevant elasticity is θy rather than 
θ
z. The following
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lemma and proposition thus first restate the equilibrium goods and labor market con-
ditions (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) in terms of measured average labor productivity. Then, they
establish the relationship between the steady state elasticities of labor market tightness
with respect to measured labor productivity in the labor search model θ
LS
y , and in the
goods and labor search model θ
GLS
y .
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2 in the steady state (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) can be rewritten
as
0 = (1− ψdQ )UCC + UDD (1.3.6)
0 =
(
(1− µ)fL −
(
µθ +
1− β(1− δ)
βpiv
)
(χfL + κ¯V )
) N
f − κ¯y + (1− µ)
UN
ψ
d
Q UC
(1.3.7)
and the real wage (1.3.5) as
w
p
= µ(fL + θ(χfL + κ¯V ))
N
f − κ¯y − (1− µ)
UN
ψ
d
Q UC
(1.3.8)
Assuming µGLS = µLS and provided that all denominators are non-zero
1
θGLSy
=
1
θLSy
+
1
1 + MRSCNC
(
1− σ
σ
m
G
D 
QX
z + 
MRSCN
D 
Q
z
)
1
θGLSz
(1.3.9)
Proposition 4 (Amplification - shocks to technology). Suppose that µGLS = µLS.
Under Assumptions 1A and 2 θ
GLS
y > 
θLS
y as long as m
G has elasticity of substitution
σ > 1. Under Assumptions 1B and 2 θ
GLS
y > 
θLS
y as long as u has relative risk aversion
coefficient η ≤ 1 and σ ≥ 1; or alternatively η ≤ 1 and σ < 1 and gDD is sufficiently
small.
As (1.3.9) shows, in addition to the channel that works through higher steady state
value of non-market activity and thus lower bargaining power, goods market frictions
introduce two other channels which can result in amplification of effects that changes in
technology have on labor market tightness. These two additional effects work through
changes in the value of non-market activity over the business cycle, as a result of goods
market search frictions.
First, there is an effect similar to the one that creates a hump shaped profile of
consumption in a lifecycle model with preferences that are not separable between con-
sumption and leisure. If preferences are not additively separable and changes in search
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effort affect marginal rate of substitution between consumption and hours worked, an
increase in z causes an additional effect captured in (1.3.9) by the term MRSCND 
Q
z .
In particular, with GHH preferences from Assumption 1B if |UCC | < 1 consumption
and search effort both increase in response to an increase in z. Because of the non-
separability in utility, with increased search effort the marginal utility of consumption
decreases less compared to the standard labor search model; this in turn means a smaller
increase in the value of non-market activity, smaller upward pressure on wage in (1.3.8),
and larger incentives for firms to hire new workers.
Second, there is an effect related to the amount of search effort needed to acquire
one unit of consumption good changes over the business cycle. If the elasticity of
substitution of the goods market matching function is different from one, changes in D
and X affect how severe goods markets frictions are, in the sense that they change the
elasticity ψ
d
Q . An increase in z then results in an additional effect captured in (1.3.9)
by the term 1−σσ 
mG
D 
QX
z . To see how this effect works, consider the case where output
supplied X and search effort D both increase in response to an increase in z. These two
have in general opposing effects on ψ
d
Q ; however, for additively separable preferences
from Assumption 1A it holds that QXz ≥ 0 with equality if gDD = 0 and UCC = 0, and
for GHH preferences from Assumption 1B similarly QXz ≥ 0 with equality if gDD = 0.
As a result if σ > 1 and productivity z increases, goods markets frictions become less
severe, that is ψ
d
Q increases; this implies a smaller increase in the value of non-market
activity, smaller upward pressure on wage in (1.3.8), and larger incentives for firms to
hire new workers.
Changes in Preferences
Consider next the effects of a change in preference parameter ζd. Lower disutility
from search results in higher search effort, which increases output and measured pro-
ductivity even if technology z and employment would remain constant. This induced
change in measured labor productivity y will however affect firms’ incentives to hire
new workers, and thus also labor market tightness θ. Similar to the case with changes
in technology z discussed above, the relevant elasticity is θ
GLS
y rather than 
θGLS
ζd
. The
relationship between steady state elasticity θ
LS
y in response to a change in technology z
in the labor search model, and the steady state elasticity θ
GLS
y in response to a change in
preferences ζd in the model with goods and labor search can be summarized as follows.
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Proposition 5 (Amplification - preference shocks). Suppose that µGLS = µLS. Under
Assumptions 1A and 2 θ
GLS
y R θ
LS
y when m
G has elasticity of substitution σ Q 1.
Consider a decrease in disutility ζd. When search effort by consumers and supply
of goods and services by firms are complements in the matching function mG, higher
search effort results in larger incentives for firms to hire more workers in order to increase
production, which is now more likely to be sold. Moreover, lower disutility from search
per unit of good purchased UD
ψd
provides additional incentives to hire more workers,
since it creates a downward pressure on wages. The overall effect of the change in
measured productivity on labor market tightness is larger than in the model with labor
search only. When search effort and supply of goods and services are substitutes in the
matching function mG, incentives for firms to hire more workers in order to increase
production are smaller, increase in search effort in much larger, and the result is actually
a decrease in ψd and an increase in disutility from search per unit of good purchased UD
ψd
.
The overall effect a same change in measured productivity on labor market tightness is
consequently smaller than in the model with labor search only.
Worker’s Outside Option and Bargaining Power
As already briefly mentioned above, goods market frictions provide some justification
for the calibration in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), in particular for the choice of
a high value of outside option of the worker and a low worker’s bargaining power. To
see this, consider an extension of the model where in addition to having more leisure,
unemployed workers are engaged in home production and also receive unemployment
benefit pb financed by a lump sum tax. Consumption c is then a composite good given
by c = g(cm, cn), where cm is the amount of market goods and services and cn = h(1−n)
is the amount of home produced goods and services. The wage in this economy is a
small modification of (1.3.5)
w
p
= µψx(zfL + θ(χzfL + κV )) + (1− µ)
(
b+
UCgcnh1−n
UCgcm +
UD
ψd
− UN
UC +
UD
ψd
)
21
and the goods and labor market conditions (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) in the steady state become
0 = (1− ψdQ )ψdgcmUC + UD
0 =
(
(1− µ)zfL −
(
µθ +
1− β(1− δ)
βpiv
)
(χzfL + κv)
)
ψx − (1− µ)
(
b+
gcnh(1−n)
ψ
d
Q gcm
− UN
ψ
d
Q UC
)
The steady state condition for labor market implies that the outside option of the worker
gets larger, when goods market search frictions become more severe and ψ
d
Q becomes
smaller. Arguably, given that the productivity of workers in home production and the
process through which market and nonmarket goods are combined into the composite
consumption good remain unchanged, the bargaining power of the worker µ thus has to
be lower, if the same economy is viewed through the lens of the model with goods and
labor search, rather than the standard labor search model. This provides yet another
channel, in addition to those in Proposition 4, through which goods market frictions
amplify effects of changes in productivity: As shown in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008),
increasing the value of non-market activity and at the same time decreasing worker’s
bargaining power to maintain the same steady state wage leads to wages which are less
procyclical, and thus vacancies and unemployment which respond more to changes in
productivity.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
I consider the case with additively separable preferences
u(c, d, e, ζ) = ζc
c1−η
1− η − ζd
d1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− ζne
Firms operate production technology given by zf(l) = zlλ; labor and goods market
matching functions are mL(U, V ) = B(γU
ν−1
ν + (1 − γ)V ν−1ν ) νν−1 and mG(D,TX) =
A
(
αD
σ−1
σ + (1−α)(TX)σ−1σ ) σσ−1 . To calculate steady state elasticities from Section 1.3
values for following parameters have to be set: β, η, ϕ, λ, µ, δ, γ, ν, B, α, σ,A, ζ¯c, ζ¯d, ζ¯n, z¯.
For the dynamic simulation of the model in addition processes for z, ζc, ζd, ζn also have
to be specified. In this section I first describe targets chosen to be matched in the
U.S. data to calibrate the above parameters, and then describe the Bayesian estimation
procedure used to estimate parameters of the processes for z, ζc, ζd, ζn.
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1.4.1 Calibration
Table 1.1 summarizes the targets and the parameter vales for the benchmark calibration.
One period of the model is one fourth of a quarter, so roughly a week, and parameter
β is chosen to obtain steady state annual interest rate of 5%. I set z¯ to normalize
the level of realized output Y = 1 and consider the case with constant returns to
scale so that λ = 1. For labor market matching function parameters, I follow Shimer
(2010) by setting ν = 1, γ = 0.5 which implies a symmetric Cobb-Douglas matching
function. As in Shimer (2005) I set the value of unemployment benefits b to 0.4 of average
labor productivity in the steady state. The case with non-zero unemployment benefits
allows a more precise calibration of the outside option of the worker, and implies that
even in the case with logarithmic preferences and goods market matching function with
unit elasticity of substitution, both technology and preference shocks have an effect on
unemployment. Next, as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), I use weekly job finding
rate piu = 0.139 and separation rate δ = 0.0081; these values imply a steady state
unemployment rate U = 0.055. Silva and Toledo (2009) and Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) provide estimates for average costs associated with recruiting, screening and
interviewing needed to hire a new worker: the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot
Project survey, the 1992 Small Business Administration survey, and the findings in
Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) suggests that these costs are about 4.5% of new
worker’s quarterly wages paid. Since a vacancy in the model attracts piv workers to get
one worker 1piv vacancies are needed. To match the above estimated hiring costs, if w is
the weekly wage in the model, the total costs of a hire are 1pivw = 0.045×12×w. Thus for
a weekly model I target piv = 112
1
0.045 = 1.8519. Given the job finding and recruitment
rates targeted, since pi
u
piv = θ and pi
u = Bθ1−γ the matching efficiency parameter is
B = (piu)γ(piv)1−γ = 0.507.
For the benchmark I set the preference parameters so that ϕ = 0 and η targets
intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 1. I set ζ¯c = 1 and calibrate ζ¯d to
normalize the steady state goods market tightness to Q = 1. The calibration of labor
market matching function parameters above is based on direct empirical estimates (see
Pissarides & Petrongolo, 2001), similar studies are unfortunately not available for the
goods market matching function. Bai et al. (2012) and Bai and R´ıos-Rull (2013) assume
a Cobb-Douglas matching functions with elasticity with respect to demand α = 0.09
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Table 1.1: Calibration
value target or source value
β 0.999 annual interest rate 5%
λ 1.00
γ 0.50 Shimer (2010)
µ 0.50 Hosios condition
δ 0.0081 quarterly employment exit prob. 0.100
B 0.507 quarterly recruitment cost 0.045w
α 0.20
A 0.848 capacity utilization rate 0.81
z¯ 1.313 output 1
ζn 0.412 unemployment rate 0.055
ζd 0.236 goods market tightness 1.00
and α = 0.25 respectively, Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2011) use symmetric Cobb-
Douglas matching function with elasticity 0.5. In the benchmark calibration of the goods
market matching function I thus set σ = 1, α = 0.2 and calibrate A to obtain steady
state fraction of goods purchased CX = 0.81. To get an idea how much the elasticity of
substitution in the goods market matching function matters for the quantitative results,
I then also consider alternative cases with σ = 0.5 and σ = 2.
Finally, to set ζ¯n notice that for a given bargaining power µ, value of home production
and leisure ζn affects wage and through that profits of the firms, hiring, labor tightness
θ, and also U . For the model without goods market friction I thus proceed as Shimer
(2010), set µ = γ and calibrate ζ¯n to match the above mentioned target unemployment
rate U = 0.055. In the model with goods market search parameters µ and ζn can
then be set in two alternative ways. In the first µ is kept unchanged and value of home
production and leisure ζn is recalibrated to maintain the same steady state labor market
tightness θ. In the second one ζn is kept unchanged and µ is recalibrated. I use the first
approach in order to quantify the amplification effect of goods market frictions beyond
the effect implied by a lower bargaining power as discussed in Section 3.2.2 above.
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1.4.2 Steady State Elasticities
Table 1.2 compares the steady state elasticity of vacancy-unemployment ratio with
respect to measured average labor productivity θy for the goods and labor search model
in this paper, elasticities from existing labor search models in related papers, and also
the empirical counterpart of this elasticity based on the data for U.S economy.
As shown in the top panel of Table 1.2, the standard deviation of log of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio in U.S. for the 1951 to 2003 period is 19.1 times larger than the
standard deviation of log average labor productivity. In contrast, as shown in the first
line of the second panel the steady state elasticity θy in Shimer (2005) is only 1.71.
Subsequent papers by Hall (2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008) obtain elasticity in their
models even larger than the target in the data, by modifying the wage determination
mechanism to get less procyclical wages. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) maintain
Nash bargaining and are able to generate the right amount of fluctuations through
different calibration, by setting workers’ bargaining power to µ = 0.052 and the value
of unemployment to b = 0.955. This large value of unemployment however implies a
semielasticity of unemployment to changes in unemployment benefits replacement ratio
Ub which is seven times larger than what is empirically observed in U.S. data (Costain
& Reiter, 2008).
Pissarides (2009) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) point out that σθσy corr(θ, y) is
a more appropriate target then a simple ratio σθσy , to evaluate any model where pro-
ductivity shocks are the only source driving of fluctuations. Arguably, other shocks, to
preferences, matching efficiency, separation rate, bargaining power or interest rates can
to some extent be the reason behind the fluctuations in vacancy-unemployment ratio ob-
served in data. The choice of σθσy corr(θ, y) as a target is then justified, because this would
be the coefficient obtained by running a regression of log of the vacancy-unemployment
ratio on log average labor productivity. This yields 7.56 as a target against which
Pissarides (2009) and Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) compare the steady state elastic-
ity θy in their versions of the labor search model which feature labor turnover costs as
an additional element. Both papers show that the amount of fixed training costs needed
to achieve the target value for the elasticity is quite plausible, in the range of 20% to
40% of the quarterly output of the match. Silva and Toledo (2013) however point out
that the crucial detail that matters is the fraction of the labor turnover costs that are
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Table 1.2: Comparison of models based on steady state elasticity θy
US data (1951:2003 period, from Shimer (2005))
σθ
σy
19.10
σθ
σy
corr(yˆ, θ) 7.56
Labor search models θy
Shimer (2005) 1.71
Hall (2005) 81.70
Hall and Milgrom (2008) 42.35
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) 23.72
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) 7.56
Pissarides (2009) 7.25
Silva and Toledo (2013) 4.17
Benchmark labor search model, α = 0 θy
η = 1, b = 0.4 3.69
Goods and labor search model, α = 0.2 θy
η = 1, b = 0.4, σ = 2 z: 5.03 and ζd: 1.10
η = 1, b = 0.4, σ = 0.5 z: 2.82 and ζd: 9.05
sunk at the point when the match is created. In addition, they show that increasing the
labor turnover costs has a similar effect on the response of unemployment to changes in
unemployment benefits as an increase in the value of unemployment in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). Using the available empirical evidence on training costs to discipline
the calibration, in addition to restricting the semielasticity Ub empirically observed in
U.S. data, they find no amplification mechanism generated by fixed labor turnover costs.
Their value of elasticity θy = 4.17 in the model with labor turnover costs is essentially
the same as θy = 4.18 in the model without these costs, and is also very close to no
labor turnover costs benchmark from Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) where θy = 3.89
and Pissarides (2009) where θy = 3.67.
26
Calibration of the benchmark model with labor search in this paper results in elas-
ticity of similar magnitude since θ
LS
y = 3.69. In comparison, in a model with goods and
labor search, θ
GLS
y is about 40% larger when the driving force is a productivity shock
and goods market matching function has elasticity of substitution σ = 2, and about
150% larger when the driving force is a preference shock and goods market match-
ing function has elasticity of substitution σ = 0.5. This amplification is in line with
theoretical results in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
1.4.3 Estimation
To specify the parameters for shock processes ζc, ζd, ζn, z, I first consider the model with
only one shock at a time; and the process considered is log x′ = (1−ρx) log x¯+ρx log x+e′x
for each shock x ∈ {z, ζc, ζd, ζn}. To obtain the autocorrelation coefficients ρx and vari-
ance of innovations σ2x, I estimate a log-linearized weekly model using Bayesian methods,
to match quarterly time series for average labor productivity.2 The labor productivity
measure used for estimation is 1951Q1-2010Q4 output per worker in nonfarm business
sector. Quarterly labor productivity yt is calculated as quarterly output Yt divided
by the quarter’s employment Nt. Quarterly output is the sum of weekly output, and
quarterly employment is given by the average employment in the three months of the
quarter.
Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 show the choice of prior distributions, the estimated posterior
mode obtained by maximizing the log of the posterior distribution with respect to the
parameters, the approximate standard error based on the corresponding Hessian, and
also the mean, mode, 10 and 90 percentile of the posterior distribution of the parameters
obtained through the random walk Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm with four
chains and 100000 draws. The estimated standard deviations for ζc and ζn shocks in
the model without goods market search are very large, much larger than in the model
with both search frictions. This is to be expected since the only channel through which
they can generate movements in measured labor productivity y is through their effect
on θ and productive workforce L = N − θ(1 − N). Thus recruitment needs to vary a
lot to match the measured labor productivity, which requires big shocks to preferences.
2 See An and Schorfheide (2007), Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) and Lubik (2009) for details
regarding Bayesian estimation.
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Table 1.3: Parameter estimates for labor search model
Prior Posterior
mean st.dev. mode mean 90 % HPD interval
ρc Beta 0.900 0.05 0.9965 0.9963 [0.9945,0.9981]
σc Inverse Gamma 0.010 20.00 0.2552 0.2576 [0.2367,0.2782]
Log data density 792.27
ρn Beta 0.900 0.05 0.9964 0.9963 [0.9945,0.9981]
σe Inverse Gamma 0.010 20.00 0.2531 0.2553 [0.2346,0.2749]
Log data density 792.28
ρz Beta 0.900 0.05 0.9956 0.9954 [0.9934,0.9976]
σz Inverse Gamma 0.010 20.00 0.0035 0.0035 [0.0033,0.0038]
Log data density 796.99
Table 1.4: Parameter estimates for goods and labor search model
Prior Posterior
mean st.dev. mode mean 90 % HPD interval
ρc Beta 0.900 0.05 0.9962 0.9960 [0.9941,0.9979]
σc Inverse Gamma 0.010 20.00 0.0198 0.0200 [0.0185,0.0215]
Log data density 797.27
ρd Beta 0.900 0.05 0.9957 0.9956 [0.9935,0.9976]
σd Inverse Gamma 0.010 20.00 0.0175 0.0176 [0.0163,0.0189]
Log data density 796.47
ρn Beta 0.900 0.05 0.9930 0.9928 [0.9899,0.9959]
σn Inverse Gamma 0.010 20.00 0.1336 0.1349 [0.1237,0.1462]
Log data density 777.72
ρz Beta 0.900 0.05 0.9957 0.9955 [0.9935,0.9976]
σz Inverse Gamma 0.010 20.00 0.0044 0.0044 [0.0041,0.0048]
Log data density 797.71
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1.4.4 Business Cycle Moments
Unitary Elasticity of Substitution
Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 show the results of the simulation of models with and without
goods market friction, with parameters of shocks set at their posterior means. Com-
paring panels (A) and (B) in Table 1.5 we can see that the large shocks to ζc required
to generate the observed movements in labor productivity cause fluctuation in labor
market tightness and recruitment which are 20 times higher than in the data. More-
over, the correlations of all variables with measured labor productivity y have wrong
signs - if z is constant, for measured labor productivity y to increase, productive la-
bor L = N − θ(1 − N) has to increase relative to overall labor N , and thus θ has to
fall. Shocks to disutility from work ζn suffer from the same problem. Thus without
goods market frictions technology shocks are the only plausible source of business cycle
fluctuations in this model.
Table 1.5: U.S. data and labor search model
(A) U.S. data (B) Consumption utility shock ζc
st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr. st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr.
y 0.013 1.00 0.67 0.76 0.013 1.00 -0.89 0.75
θ 0.266 0.34 0.88 0.91 5.060 -0.98 0.89 0.77
V 0.141 0.42 0.89 0.91 3.137 -0.92 0.71 0.60
U 0.131 -0.24 -0.83 0.89 2.282 0.91 -1.00 0.83
(C) Labor disutility shock ζn (D) Productivity shock z
st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr. st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr.
y 0.013 1.00 -0.89 0.75 0.014 1.00 1.00 0.78
θ 5.011 -0.98 0.89 0.77 0.051 0.99 0.99 0.78
V 3.101 -0.92 0.71 0.60 0.031 0.93 0.91 0.63
U 2.262 0.91 -1.00 0.83 0.023 -0.94 -0.95 0.83
Once goods market search is introduced into the model the situation changes con-
siderably. Panels (A) and (D) of Table 1.6 document the observational equivalence of
technology shocks z and preference shocks ζd from Proposition 2: shocks to disutility
from search in goods market generate the same fluctuations as technology shocks. Com-
paring panels (D) for the two economies, with and without goods market search reveals
that the volatility of labor market tightness is basically the same in both economies.
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Table 1.6: Summary statistics, goods and labor search model, σ = 1
(A) Shopping disutility shock ζd (B) Consumption utility shock ζc
st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr. st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr.
y 0.014 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.013 1.00 0.98 0.76
θ 0.050 0.99 0.99 0.78 0.465 0.99 0.98 0.78
V 0.031 0.93 0.91 0.63 0.284 0.94 0.87 0.63
U 0.023 -0.94 -0.95 0.83 0.212 -0.92 -0.98 0.83
(C) Labor disutility shock ζn (D) Productivity shock z
st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr. st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr.
y 0.018 1.00 -0.99 0.82 0.014 1.00 1.00 0.78
θ 2.492 -0.95 0.89 0.77 0.050 0.99 0.99 0.78
V 1.542 -0.80 0.71 0.60 0.031 0.93 0.91 0.63
U 1.127 0.99 -1.00 0.83 0.023 -0.94 -0.95 0.83
This is also in line with theoretical analysis in the previous ch1:sec: Proposition 4 proved
that for steady state elasticity θy there is no amplification in the case with additively
separable utility function and goods market matching function with unitary elasticity
of substitution. For shocks to marginal utility of consumption ζc, the size of the shocks
necessary to generate the observed movements in labor productivity falls once the goods
market search is introduced. Moreover, correlations of all variables with measured labor
productivity y have now correct signs, and fluctuations of labor market tightness and
recruitment are closer to those in data.
Non-Unitary Elasticity of Substitution
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 present the moments for the goods and labor search model with
elasticity of substitution between D and X in the goods matching function of 0.5 and 2.
They confirm the results from Proposition 4, which were already suggested by steady
state elasticities in Table 1.2. In the case with high substitutability and technology
shocks, the observed fluctuations in vacancy-unemployment ratio are about 30% larger,
compared to the model with labor search only. In the case with low substitutability,
preference shocks to disutility from search for goods result in observed fluctuations in
vacancy-unemployment ratio that are about 130% larger.
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Table 1.7: Summary statistics, goods and labor search model, σ = 0.5
(A) Shopping disutility shock ζd (B) Consumption utility shock ζc
st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr. st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr.
y 0.014 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.013 1.00 0.97 0.76
θ 0.121 0.99 0.99 0.78 0.782 0.99 0.96 0.78
V 0.074 0.93 0.90 0.63 0.479 0.94 0.84 0.62
U 0.055 -0.93 -0.96 0.83 0.356 -0.91 -0.99 0.83
(C) Labor disutility shock ζn (D) Productivity shock z
st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr. st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr.
y 0.017 1.00 -0.98 0.82 0.014 1.00 1.00 0.78
θ 3.051 -0.96 0.89 0.77 0.039 0.99 0.99 0.78
V 1.888 -0.83 0.71 0.60 0.024 0.92 0.92 0.63
U 1.379 0.99 -1.00 0.83 0.018 -0.94 -0.95 0.83
Table 1.8: Summary statistics, goods and labor search model, σ = 2
(A) Shopping disutility shock ζd (B) Consumption utility shock ζc
st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr. st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr.
y 0.014 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.013 1.00 0.99 0.76
θ 0.015 0.99 0.99 0.78 0.272 0.99 0.98 0.78
V 0.009 0.92 0.92 0.63 0.167 0.94 0.89 0.63
U 0.007 -0.94 -0.94 0.83 0.124 -0.92 -0.96 0.83
(C) Labor disutility shock ζn (D) Productivity shock z
st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr. st.dev. corr(·,y) corr(·,Y ) autocorr.
y 0.018 1.00 -0.99 0.83 0.014 1.00 1.00 0.78
θ 1.869 -0.93 0.89 0.77 0.067 0.99 0.99 0.78
V 1.154 -0.78 0.71 0.60 0.041 0.93 0.91 0.63
U 0.846 1.00 -1.00 0.83 0.030 -0.93 -0.95 0.83
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1.4.5 Impulse Response Analysis
Weekly impulse response functions to shocks that generate a one percent increase in
measured labor productivity are shown in Figure 1.1. As expected given the results so
far, the response to technology shock z and preference shock ζd are virtually identical for
the case with unit elasticity of substitution. Only the behavior of goods market tightness
is different. The other two cases imply either a stronger response of unemployment to
technology shocks (if the elasticity of substitution between X and D is high) or to
preference shocks (if the elasticity of substitution between X and D is low).
To examine further the dynamics of the labor market variables in the model, I
next look at the impulse response functions for the model generated quarterly data,
and compare them to their empirical counterparts. To that end, I first use quarterly
U.S. data on labor productivity, vacancies, unemployment, and employment to estimate
a reduced form VAR x˜t =
∑4
i=1 Aix˜t−i + εt with x˜t = (y˜t, θ˜t, N˜t)
′, where y˜t, θ˜t, N˜t
are the log transformed average labor productivity, vacancy-unemployment ratio and
employment, detrended using a third order time polynomial. I then obtain the empirical
impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation shock to productivity, using the
Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize shocks with an identification scheme where
the shock to productivity is first in the ordering. Afterwards, I run 1000 simulations
of the model, each time aggregate the data into quarterly time series and estimate the
same VAR on this artificial data. Figure 1.2 compares the resulting average impulse
response functions with empirical counterparts. The top panel shows the case where
goods market matching function has unitary elasticity of substitution, and the response
of employment and labor market tightness to an increase in the measured productivity is
the same in the model without goods market search and with goods market search. This
is again in line with results from Proposition 4 and Proposition 5. With non-unitary
elasticity of substitution, the model with goods markets frictions performs better than
the model with labor search only in terms of amplification, but the problem with the
lack of propagation is still present. The response of employment to an increase in
measured labor productivity in the model is on impact similar to the response in data,
but while in the data employment further increases in the following quarters and the
peak occurs after five quarters from the initial shock, in the model this build up is much
less pronounced and rather short lived, with peak already in the third quarter.
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Figure 1.1: Impulse response function, weekly model
σ = 1
σ = 0.5
σ = 2
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Figure 1.2: Impulse response function, quarterly data
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the fluctuations of unemployment in a framework that emphasizes
the role of consumer demand in determining the output and employment. In particular,
it examines the amplification of shocks in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model after
goods market search-matching friction is introduced. When wages are determined by
Nash bargaining, goods market frictions affect worker’s bargaining position, provide
rationale for high value of non-market activity, but also change its cyclical properties.
This last effect arises since higher availability of goods in expansions makes frictions
in the goods market less severe from consumer’s perspective, thus increasing the value
of additional earnings obtained when the worker accepts the job. In addition, in the
framework analyzed in this paper supply side shocks to technology and demand side
shocks to preferences can generate business cycle fluctuations that are observationally
equivalent to an economist who would only consider time series for labor productivity,
output, employment and wages.
I estimate the model first using data on U.S. average labor productivity, and show
that a modest amount of goods market frictions increases the response of unemployment
to technology shocks by one third when search effort and output supplied by firms are
good substitutes in the goods market matching function. With low substitutability
preference shocks result in response of unemployment which is about two and half times
larger than the response to technology shocks in model with labor search only.
Chapter 2
Inventories and Unemployment
2.1 Introduction
As shown in Chapter 1, it is possible to obtain a significantly larger response of un-
employment to changes in measured labor productivity by introducing goods market
frictions into a labor search-matching model. But the previous chapter also shows that
the magnitude of this amplification effect depends on the elasticity of substitution of
the goods market matching function, and whether the change in measured labor pro-
ductivity was caused by a technology or a preference shock. Moreover, using only data
on labor productivity, output, employment or wages it is not possible to separately
identify the technology and preference shocks, or the elasticity of substitution of the
goods market matching function.
In this chapter I show that inventories, which naturally arise in an environment
where search frictions prevent firms from selling all goods instantaneously, provide a
way to determine the relative importance of technology and preference shocks. The two
sources of fluctuations can be distinguished because technology and preference shocks
have different implications for the response of inventory-sales ratio in the model. In
particular, in a model without capital this ratio increases in response to a positive
technology shock, but decreases in response to a preference shock. Intuitively, in the
model with inventories a positive shock to technology results in a build up of inventories
relative to sales if the demand does not increase; if on the other hand technology is
unchanged and the shock decreases consumers’ disutility from search, the result is a drop
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of inventories relative to sales. And because the size od the response of inventory-sales
ratio depends on the elasticity of substitution in the goods market matching function
σ, data on inventories and sales provide a source of identification for this parameter.
In the model estimated using data on labor productivity and inventory-sales ratio
the response of vacancy-unemployment ratio is twice as large as in the model with labor
search only. In addition, model can match the main facts on inventories - procyclical
inventory investment, countercyclical inventories-sales ratio, and sales which are more
volatile that production. The two empirical facts, that inventory-sales ratio is coun-
tercyclical, and that sales are more volatile than production turned out to pose quite
a challenge in developing models that would be able to replicate them (see Ramey &
West, 1999, Bils & Kahn, 2000 and Khan & Thomas, 2007b for further discussion on
this issue). As shown here, a relatively simple model with goods market frictions and
with demand and supply side shocks can actually match these facts quite well.
2.2 Inventories in the Model with Goods Market Search
I first extend the model from Chapter 1 by allowing firms to store goods that are not
sold, in an attempt to sell them in the future. Thus let i be the stock of inventories at
the beginning of period and i′ the amount of goods carried over to the next period then
i′ = (1− δi)(1− ψx)x
where δi ∈ (0, 1) captures the loss of value due to obsoleteness, the fact that some
goods will not be demanded at all in the future, and also the storage costs and the
inability to store services. As a second, minor modification, production technology in
the economy is subject to permanent and transitory shocks. The growth rate of the
permanent component is
γ′A =
A′
A
and the aggregate supply of goods is
X = zAf(N − V ) + I
To guarantee that the model is compatible with long run balanced growth, I assume
that the permanent component of the technology also makes search effort by consumer
in the goods market more productive; the amount of goods sold is thus mG(AD,TX).
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The aggregate state now comprises of the shocks, measure of employed workers, and
the stock of inventories at the beginning of period, S = (z, ζ, A,N, I).
The problem of the firm is then a modification of (1.2.3)
Ω(n, i; S) = max
v,p,Q,x
{
pψx(Q,X(S), A)x− w(S)n+ E[m(S,S′)Ω(n′, i′; S′)]}
subject to
x = zAf(n− v) + i
n′ = (1− δn)n+ piv(θ(S))v
i′ = (1− δi)(1− ψx(Q,X(S), A))x
W ∗d (S) = Ud(S) + (Uc(S)− pM(S))ψd(Q,X(S), A)
S′ = G(S)
Presence of inventories in the model does not affect the household’s problem, which
remains essentially same as (1.2.2)
W (s; S) = max
c,d,a′
{
U(c, d, n, ζ) + βEW (s′; S′)
}
subject to
p(S)c+ a′ = (1 +R(S))a+ w(S)n+ p(S)b(S)(1− n)− t(S)
c = dψd(Q(S), X(S), A)
n′ = (1− δn)n+ piu(θ(S))(1− n)
S′ = G(S)
The only difference in the households problem above comes from unemployment benefits,
which as discussed in Section 1.4 are introduced to allow a more precise calibration of
the outside option of a worker.
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Following similar steps as in Appendix A and Appendix B one can obtain a system
of equations for goods and labor markets tightnesses Q and θ
− Ud = (1− ψ
d
Q )ψ
d
[
Uc − (1− δi)βE
[(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)
(Ωri )
′
]]
1
piv
zAflΩ
r
i
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
= βE
[(
1− µ− µθ′ + 1− δn
(piv)′
)
z′A′f ′l (Ω
r
i )
′
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)
− (1− µ)
[(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)
b− U ′n
]]
where the real marginal value of inventories Ωri =
Ωi
p evolves according to
Ωri = ψ
x + (1− ψx)(1− δi)βE
[
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
Uc +
Ud
ψd
(Ωri )
′
]
The stochastic difference equation for labor market tightness θ is a minor generalization
of (1.3.2), because the marginal unit of output produced is now worth Ωri instead of
just ψx as in the model without inventories. The additional term in the goods market
condition compared to (1.3.1) for the benchmark model captures the fact that increased
effort lowers the stock of inventories and thus also the amount of goods that could be
potentially purchased and consumed in the next period.
Finally, in the model with inventories the measured labor productivity is given by
y =
ψxX + I ′ − I
N
Because of the stochastic trend A that increases productivity, some endogenous
variable in the model economy are also growing. To stationarize the model, supply of
goods by firms, consumption, output, and end of period stock of inventories need to
be divided by the stochastic trend A. The equations that characterize the dynamics of
model variables are then log-linearized; the resulting set of equations can be found in
Appendix D.
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2.3 Quantitative Analysis
2.3.1 Calibration
Calibration of the model with inventories largely follows Chapter 1. I again consider
the case where workers have additively separable preferences
u(c, d, e, ζ) = ζc log c− ζdd− ζne
firms operate production technology given by zf(l) = zAlλ, and two matching functions,
for the labor and goods markets are mL(U, V ) = B(γU
ν−1
ν + (1 − γ)V ν−1ν ) νν−1 and
mG(AD,TX) =
(
αAD
σ−1
σ + (1− α)(TX)σ−1σ ) σσ−1 .
A period in the model is a month and parameter β is chosen to obtain annual interest
rate of 5%. I set z¯ to normalize consumption C = 1 and consider the case with constant
returns to scale so that λ = 1.
For labor market matching function parameters, I again set ν = 1, γ = 0.5 which
implies a symmetric Cobb-Douglas matching function. As in Shimer (2005) I set b to
obtain unemployment benefits on balanced growth path equal to 0.4 of average labor
productivity. The monthly finding rate is piu = 0.58 and the separation rate δn = 0.034;
these values imply unemployment rate on balanced growth path U = 0.055. Following
Silva and Toledo (2009) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) I target the average costs
associated with recruiting, screening and interviewing needed to hire a new worker as
4.5% of new worker’s quarterly wages paid. Since a vacancy in the model attracts piv
workers to get one worker 1piv vacancies are needed. To match the above hiring costs, if
w is the monthly wage in the model, the total costs of a hire are 1pivw = 0.045× 3× w.
Thus piv = 13
1
0.045 = 7.4074. Given the job finding and recruitment rates targeted, since
piu
piv = θ and pi
u = Bθ1−γ the matching efficiency parameter is B = (piu)γ(piv)1−γ = 2.08.
I set µ = γ and calibrate ζ¯n to match the above mentioned target unemployment rate
U = 0.055.
I calibrate ζ¯d to normalize the goods market tightness on balanced growth path to
Q = 1, assume a symmetric matching functions with α = 0.5. Parameter δi is chosen
to reflect that for services sector depreciation is effectively 1, and for goods sector the
quarterly depreciation is 0.15. As services constitute three quarters of the output of
model economy, the implied overall monthly depreciation of inventories is 0.763.
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2.3.2 Estimation
All three exogenous driving forces in the model are assumed to follow an AR(1) process,
thus
log ξ′ = (1− ρξ) log ξ¯ + ρξ log ξ + ′ξ,
for ξ ∈ {γA, z, ζd} where ′ξ ∼ N(0, η2ξ ).
The two time series used in the Bayesian estimation are the quarterly growth rate of
the average labor productivity γy = ∆ log
Y
N and the ratio of inventories to sales ι =
I
C .
Average labor productivity is seasonally adjusted real output in nonfarm business sector
constructed by the BLS from NIPA divided by employment form the monthly Current
Population Survey, the ratio of inventories to sales is constructed using data for real
nonfarm inventories and real final sales of domestic business from BEA. The sample
used for estimation spans the period 1951Q1-2010Q4.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the behavior of inventories to sales ratio is qualitatively
different in response to technology and preference shocks. In addition, elasticity of
substitution in the goods market matching function matters quantitatively for the mag-
nitude of response. Inventories to sales ratio thus contains information that can be used
to determine the contribution of the two shocks to the business cycle fluctuations, and
to identify the elasticity of substitution in the goods market matching function.
Figure 2.1: Impulse response functions of inventories to sales ratio for different shocks
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I estimate the parameters of the processes for γA, z and ζd and the elasticity of
substitution in the goods market matching function σ. To verify that all parameters
that are estimated are identified, I use the identification tests proposed in Iskrev (2010b).
Figure 2.2: Identification strength and sensitivity analysis
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These test is based on the idea that the autocovariogram of the observables with
respect to the vector of estimated parameters should have rank equal to the number of
the estimated parameters. For posterior mean, I find that the Jacobian matrices J2 and
J(q) employed in the tests both have full rank already with just one lag included, and so
parameters are locally identified both in the model and in the data used for estimation.
Another issue that can arise in estimation is that some parameters are identified only
weakly due to either small sensitivity of moments in the data to that parameter, or due
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to the high collinearity among some column in Jacobian matrices J2 and J(q). It is thus
useful to inspect identification strength measures from Iskrev (2010a), and the singular
value decomposition of the Fisher information matrix as proposed by Andrle (2010).
Figure 2.2 shows the identification strength measures and orders parameters according
to the strength of their identification. All estimated parameters affect the behavior
of the model, but there is some colinearity present that results in a somewhat weaker
identification of parameters of the AR(1) process for the growth rate of the stochastic
trend γA. This is confirmed by singular value decomposition pattern where the smallest
singular value is associated with parameter ρA.
Posterior distributions for parameters are obtained by random walk Metropolis-
Hastings Estimation algorithm with four chains and 500000 draws, with fist half of draws
disregarded as burn-in. The results of estimation are shown in Table 2.1. All parameters
are estimated quite tightly, with quite narrow credible intervals. The confidence intervals
for the autocorrelation coefficients ρA and ρd, and also the interval for the elasticity of
substitution is somewhat larger, reflecting the results for the strength of identification.
Elasticity of substitution σ is however estimated to be significantly below one, so supply
and demand are complements in the goods market matching function. This can be also
seen in Figure 2.3 that plots posterior distributions for estimated parameters.
Table 2.1: Parameter estimates for model with shocks to γA, z, ζd
Prior Posterior
distribution mean st.dev. mode mean 90 % HPD interval
ρd Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9466 0.9469 [0.9139,0.9832]
ρz Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9964 0.9958 [0.9930,0.9987]
ρA Beta 0.6 0.2 0.3202 0.3100 [0.1006,0.5135]
st.dev. εd Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0081 0.0086 [0.0071,0.0100]
st.dev. εz Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0042 0.0042 [0.0038,0.0047]
st.dev. εA Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0020 0.0020 [0.0016,0.0025]
σ Gamma 1 1 0.4882 0.5157 [0.3799,0.6397]
Log data density 1413.36
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Figure 2.3: Prior and posterior distributions, model with shocks to γA, z, ζd
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2.3.3 Simulation
Table 2.2 shows the main business cycle moments of the model with inventories. Based
on the results it is clear that adding goods market frictions improves the ability of
the model to replicate the behavior of labor market observed in the U.S. data. Un-
employment, vacancies and vacancy-unemployment ratio are about twice as volatile in
the extended model as in the model with labor search only in Table 1.5. The model is
also able to match other facts from U.S. data - procyclical inventories, countercyclical
inventories-sales ratio, and sales less volatile than output.
The variance decomposition shows that demand shocks are therefore important fac-
tors in explaining the behavior of unemployment over the business cycle. They account
for more than 90% of short run variance of the labor market variables. And even in
the long run, about 60% of the fluctuations in the labor market variables in the model
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics, goods and labor search model with inventories
US data GLS model
st.dev. corr(·, y) corr(·, Y ) st.dev. corr(·, y) corr(·, Y )
y 0.014 1.00 0.87 0.015 1.00 0.99
θ 0.262 0.62 0.88 0.100 0.69 0.76
V 0.140 0.66 0.89 0.060 0.64 0.69
U 0.127 -0.55 -0.83 0.045 -0.66 -0.74
Y 0.021 0.87 1.00 0.017 0.99 1.00
S 0.018 0.58 0.94 0.015 0.89 0.92
I 0.018 -0.12 0.54 0.011 0.52 0.45
I/S 0.017 -0.73 -0.41 0.016 -0.50 -0.57
are due to shocks technology to preferences; the remaining 40% are due to transitory
shocks to technology. For labor productivity the decomposition is the opposite, with
about 60% of long run variance being attributed to transitory technology shocks. Sim-
ilarly the inventory-sales ratio is affected mainly by preference shocks in the short run,
but in the long run transitory technology shocks play the main role.
Table 2.3: Conditional Variance Decomposition
Q1 Q4 Q40 Q100
z ζd z ζd z ζd z ζd
θ 6.87 93.11 9.57 90.42 33.4 66.6 41.92 58.08
Y 35.96 56.98 19.62 76.64 18.8 78.37 20.42 76.8
Y/N 41.07 51.05 26.63 68.64 30.89 65.66 34.78 61.96
I/S 18.92 80.96 29.94 70.01 68.35 31.63 75.71 24.28
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2.3.4 Technology versus Preference Shocks
Preference shock to disutility from search ζd is specific to the environment with goods
market friction, but a number of papers include other preference shocks, that affect
marginal utility of consumption (e.g, Rabanal & Rubio-Ramirez, 2005, Khan & Thomas,
2007a) or marginal utility of leisure (e.g. Del Negro & Schorfheide, 2008, Hagedorn
& Manovskii, 2011, Rios-Rull, Schorfheide, Fuentes-Albero, Kryshko, & Santaeulalia-
Llopis, 2012), or an intertemporal preference shock to the discount factor (e.g Justiniano
& Michelacci, 2011, Justiniano, Primiceri, & Tambalotti, 2010, Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe,
2012). Chapter 1 demonstrates that in the environment with goods market frictions a
shock to marginal utility of consumption by itself can actually generate fluctuations in
labor productivity, output, employment and labor market tightness very similar to those
in the U.S. data when elasticity of substitution of the goods market function is σ = 2.
The elasticity of substitution in that model was however not obtained by estimation. I
thus reestimate the model with inventories, now with technology shocks z and A and
with preference shock ζc. The observables are again the labor productivity growth rate
γy and the inventory to sales ratio ι. The reason for the choice of observables is that
a preference shock ζc has a similar effect on inventory to sales ratio as the preference
shock ζd, it leads to a fall in inventories relative to sales.
The results of estimation are shown in Table 2.4 and the implied business cycle
properties of the model are in Table 2.5. The estimate for the elasticity of substitution
is close to the value obtained in model with preference shocks ζd, but the overall per-
formance of the model is now somewhat closer to the data. With shock to the marginal
utility of consumption present in the model, fluctuations of the labor market tightness
and unemployment are about 60% as large as the ones observed in the U.S. data.
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Table 2.4: Parameter estimates for model with shocks to γA, z, ζc
Prior Posterior
distribution mean st.dev. mode mean 90 % HPD interval
ρc Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9354 0.9346 [0.8958,0.9754]
ρz Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9961 0.9956 [0.9928,0.9986]
ρA Beta 0.6 0.2 0.3515 0.3267 [0.1101,0.5278]
st.dev. εc Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0081 0.0083 [0.0072,0.0093]
st.dev. εz Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0044 0.0045 [0.0040,0.0049]
st.dev. εA Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0020 0.0021 [0.0016,0.0025]
σ Gamma 1 1 0.4490 0.4596 [0.3699,0.5498]
Log data density 1403.61
Figure 2.4: Prior and posterior distributions, model with shocks to γA, z, ζc
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics, goods and labor search model with inventories
US data GLS model
st.dev. corr(·, y) corr(·, Y ) st.dev. corr(·, y) corr(·, Y )
y 0.014 1.00 0.87 0.0150 1.00 0.98
θ 0.262 0.62 0.88 0.1621 0.66 0.77
V 0.140 0.66 0.89 0.0995 0.63 0.71
U 0.127 -0.55 -0.83 0.0740 -0.60 -0.74
Y 0.021 0.87 1.00 0.0179 0.98 1.00
S 0.018 0.58 0.94 0.0153 0.86 0.92
I 0.018 -0.12 0.54 0.0120 0.61 0.53
I/S 0.017 -0.73 -0.41 0.0145 -0.40 -0.52
2.4 Conclusion
This paper develops a model with goods and labor market search-matching frictions to
analyze the relative importance of technology (supply) shocks and preference (demand)
shocks in determining the behavior of unemployment and inventories. With both types
of shocks, the response of vacancies and unemployment to changes in measured labor
productivity is about twice as large as in the model with labor search only. In addition,
demand shocks account for the majority of fluctuations observed in the labor market in
the short run, and about half of the fluctuations in the long run. Similarly the behavior
of the inventory-sales ratio is mainly driven by demand shocks in the short run and
even in the long run they account for about a quarter of the observed fluctuations.
The results of this paper show that both the goods market frictions and the demand
shocks play an important role in determining the behavior of unemployment over the
business cycle. More work however has to be done to further explore the nature of the
demand shocks; the model provides an attractive framework to study news, noise, and
uncertainty shocks.
Chapter 3
Goods Market Frictions and the
Labor Wedge
3.1 Introduction
Business cycle models that incorporate labor market search improve upon frictionless
labor market models along several dimensions, as first shown by Andolfatto (1996) and
Merz (1995). Shimer (2005) and Shimer (2010) however raises two important issues
regarding the labor search and matching model. First, fluctuations in unemployment
and vacancies in response to productivity shocks in the calibrated model are much lower
than those observed in U.S. data. Second, since search frictions act as adjustment costs,
the measured labor wedge (the gap between firm’s marginal product of labor and house-
hold’s marginal rate of substitution) in this model resembles a procyclical labor income
tax, contrary to finding in the U.S. data. Thus instead of being able to explain fluctua-
tions in the labor wedge, adding labor market search frictions exacerbates the problem.
As a remedy to these issues, Shimer (2010) advocates for wage rigidity, in addition to
labor market search frictions, and shows that it helps to explain why unemployment
is so volatile and why measured labor wedge resembles a countercyclical tax on labor
income. However, the wage rigidity required is that wages of workers in new employ-
ment relationships are rigid over the business cycle. Given that the empirical evidence
available does not support this claim (see Pissarides, 2009 for a detailed discussion),
this solutions is not completely without its own problems. Moreover, Bils, Klenow,
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and Malin (2014) decompose the labor wedge into product market (price mark-up) and
labor market (wage mark-up) components, and argue that product market component
is at least as important as labor market component. This implies that sticky wages
and labor market matching friction can not fully account for the behavior of the labor
wedge, and sticky prices or other frictions that generate countercyclical mark-ups of the
product market component deserve more attention in the business cycle research.
In this paper I show that goods market search frictions manifest themselves as a
labor wedge. When consumers need to exert effort to purchase goods, value of marginal
earnings to a worker are modified by the extra disutility from this search. Similarly,
when firm’s are only able to sell a fraction of the output supplied to the market because
of goods market search frictions, changes in the search effort by consumer’s affect the
value of the marginal product of the labor. Thus when the economy is subject to
technology and preference shocks, a labor wedge equivalent to a countercyclical tax on
labor income arises as a consequence of improved ability of firms to sell their goods in
expansions, and the lower disutility required per unit of goods purchased by consumers
in expansions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 the business cycle
accounting approach from Chari et al. (2007) is discussed, and used to construct the U.S.
labor wedge. Section 3.3 describes the model, Section 3.4 characterizes the equilibrium
and shows that the goods market search frictions present themselves as a labor wedge.
In Section 3.5 I use Bayesian techniques to parametrize shocks in the model, and then
compare the implied business cycle properties of labor wedge generated by the model.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Labor Wedge
As Chari et al. (2007) point out, in many models mechanisms through which different
shocks result in business cycle fluctuations manifest themselves as four wedges in the
standard growth model - time varying productivity, labor and investment taxes, and
government consumption. This motivates them to propose analysis of these wedges
as a method to evaluate which mechanisms are promising in explaining business cycle
fluctuations. They show that most of the fluctuations in the postwar period can be
50
accounted for by efficiency and labor wedges, and thus stipulate that it is of particular
interest to develop models that are able to replicate the behavior of efficiency and labor
wedges observed in data.
The equilibrium in the prototype growth model that Chari et al. (2007) is charac-
terized by a following set of conditions
Y = C +K ′ − (1− δk)K + G˜ (3.2.1)
Y = z˜f(K,NH) (3.2.2)
−UH(C,H) = (1− τ˜w)z˜fL(K,NH)UC(C,H) (3.2.3)
(1 + τ˜i)UC(C,H) = βE
[(
z˜′fK(K ′, N ′H ′) + (1 + τ˜ ′i)(1− δn)
)
U ′C(C
′, H ′)
]
(3.2.4)
where z˜ is the efficiency wedge, 1−τ˜w the labor wedge, 11+τ˜i the investment wedge, and G˜
the government consumption wedge. The first condition is the resource constraint, sec-
ond one specifies production technology, third is the intratemporal optimality condition
for labor, and the last one is the intertemporal optimality condition for capital.
To construct the time series for labor wedge, it’s necessary to make assumptions
about the functional forms for preferences and technology. Consider the case where
utility and production functions are
U(C,H) = logC − ζnH
1+φ
1 + φ
and
f(K,NH) = K1−λ¯(NH)λ¯
so that (3.2.3) yields the following labor wedge
1− τ˜w = ζn
λ¯
C
Y
H1+φ
where λ¯ the average labor share in the U.S. national income, ζn is set to match the
average labor wedge of 0.6, and φ is in turns chosen to obtain three with Frisch elasticity
of labor supply equal to 0.5, 1 and 3. The data used to construct the time series for
consumption, output, and hours worked is discussed in Appendix E. The implied time
series for labor wedge is shown in Figure 3.1, and its fluctuations around the long run
trend, obtain using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 1600, are in
Figure 3.2. In both figures the grey bands represent the NBER recession dates. The
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procyclical pattern of the labor wedge 1 − τ˜w is clearly visible in both figures; for all
three values of Frisch elasticity the labor wedge increases in recessions.
Figure 3.1: U.S. Labor wedge
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Figure 3.2: U.S. Labor wedge, deviations from the HP trend
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3.3 Model
In this section I describe the model with frictional labor and goods markets which
is afterwards used to analyze the behavior of the labor wedge. There is a measure
one of identical households, each consisting of a continuum of measure one of workers.
Workers have to search in the market for jobs and also for consumption goods. There
is also a continuum of firms with measure one, each using capital and labor services to
52
produce goods. I assume that workers cannot quit and that job destruction is exogenous.
Consumption goods produced by firms are sold under competitive search in submarkets,
each indexed by price and tightness (p,Q). Search in labor market is undirected and
wage in each match is determined by Nash bargaining between worker and firm.
The aggregate state of the economy is S = (z, ζ,K, I,N), where z is the current
level of total factor productivity, ζ the current shock to preference parameters, K the
aggregate capital stock, I the stock of inventories, and N the measure of employed
workers after separations take place.
Labor Market
As in standard labor search model, search in the labor market is not directed, num-
ber of matches is given by an aggregate constant returns to scale matching function
mL(U, V ) where U are unemployed workers and V are the vacancies posted by firms.
I denote by θ = VU tightness of the market, and by pi
u(θ) = mL(1, θ) the probability
for an unemployed worker to be hired, and by piv(θ) = mL(1/θ, 1) the rate at which a
recruiter hires workers. If a worker and a recruiter meet, wage w and hours worked H
is set in every period as a solution to the asymmetric Nash bargaining problem that
splits the surplus of the match
(w(S), H(S)) = argmax
wˆ,Hˆ
Wˆn(wˆ, Hˆ)
µΩˆn(wˆ, Hˆ)
1−µ (3.3.1)
where Wˆn(wˆ, hˆ) is household’s marginal value of a worker employed under a contract
requiring arbitrary hours worked Hˆ at arbitrary wage wˆ in the current period and equi-
librium hours H at equilibrium wage w thereafter, until the job is hit by the separation
shock δn. Similarly Ωˆn(wˆ, Hˆ) is firm’s marginal value of an employed worker under a
contract requiring arbitrary hours Hˆ at arbitrary wage wˆ in the current period and
equilibrium hours H and equilibrium wage w thereafter, until the job is hit by the
separation shock δn.
Goods Market
Acquisition of consumption goods requires active search effort on the side of the
consumer to find the goods to be purchased, and I use the competitive search mechanism
(Moen, 1997) to model the frictions in the goods market. Goods market is thus divided
into submarkets, firm and household can choose in which submarket to search, and
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the maches in each submarket are determined by the same constant returns to scale
matching function mG(D,TX) with elasticity of substitution σDX . Here D is aggregate
search effort of all consumers in that particular submarket, T the measure of firms selling
in that particular submarket and X is the quantity of goods sold per firm. Submarkets
are indexed by (p,Q) where p is the price of consumption good in terms of the shares
and Q = TD is the tightness of the submarket. The amount of goods acquired per unit
of search effort by household’s shopper is
ψd(Q,X) = mG(1, QX)
and amount of output successfully sold by a firm trying to sell x goods in submarket
(p,Q), where the total amount of goods sold by all firms is X is
ψx(Q,X)x = mG
( 1
QX
, 1
)
x =
1
X
ψd(Q,X)
Q
x
Household
Households are extended families, consisting of a measure one of workers as in Merz
(1995). All workers are ex-ante identical and have preferences
E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, dt, et, ht, ζt)
where ct is consumption, dt search effort in goods market, et ∈ {0, 1} employment status
and ζt is the preference shock affecting the marginal disutility of search for consumption
good.
In the recursive formulation of the households problem, the individual state of the
household is given by amount of shares held s and number of members of the household
employed after separations take place n. Household decides about goods market search
effort of employed and unemployed workers de, du, consumption allocation ce, cu, and
about share holdings for next period s′. Each member also individually decides in
which submarket (p,Q) to search for consumption goods, and directs the search to
the submarket that delivers the biggest contribution to the utility of the household. I
incorporate this through a constraint in the problem of a firm which posts priceq and
decides about quantity sold. In addition, since in equilibrium only one market is going
to be active, in the household’s problem price of goods and goods market tightness
appear as given functions of state p(S), Q(S).
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Each employed worker receives before tax wage w(S) and works H(S) hours, each
unemployed worker receives unemployment benefits p(S)b; labor income and unemploy-
ment benefits are taxed at rate τw and the household receives transfers t(S). Taking
prices p(S), w(S), hours worked by each employed worker H(S), and dividends R(S) as
given, the household then faces a budget constraint
p(S)
(
nce + (1− n)cu
)
+ s′ = s(1 +R(S)) + (1− τw)
(
nH(S)w(S) + (1− n)p(S)b)+ t(S)
(3.3.2)
Search in goods market imposes a constraint
nce + (1− n)cu =
(
nde + (1− n)du
)
ψd(Q(S), X(S)) (3.3.3)
and the search in labor market constraint
n′ = (1− δn)n+ (1− n)piu(θ(S)) (3.3.4)
where piu(θ), ψd(Q,X) are probabilities for an individual to be matched in labor and in
goods market that households takes as given functions of θ(S), Q(S) and X(S).
Since the optimal allocation of consumption and search effort among family members
in each period solves the problem
U(c, d, n, h, ζ) = max
ce,cu,de,du
{
nu(ce, de, 1, h, ζ) + (1− n)u(cu, du, 0, 0, ζ)
}
(3.3.5)
subject to
nce + (1− n)cu = c
nde + (1− n)du = d
where c is the total amount of consumption goods available to household and d is the
overall search effort, I can formally set up the household’s problem in which it acts as
if it had preferences with utility function U(c, d, n, h, ζ). In the recursive formulation,
the problem of the household is then
W (s, n; S) = max
c,d,s′
{
U(c, d, n, h, ζ) + βEW (s′, n′; S′)
}
(3.3.6)
subject to constraints (3.3.2), (3.3.3), (3.3.4), (3.3.5) and S′ = G(S).
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Firm
The individual state of a firm is the capital stock k, stock of inventories i, and the
number of workers employed n. Each firm chooses in which submarket (p,Q) to sell
the goods, and simultaneously also how many vacancies v to open and how much of the
production to retain and use to add to the capital stock. The production of a firm is
given by function zf(k, l) where z is the productivity and l are the total hours worked
in production. The amount of goods x that the firm can potentially sell is
x = zf(k, nh− χv)− κ(v)− k′ + (1− δk)k + i
where fl > 0, fll ≤ 0 and κv ≥ 0, κvv ≥ 0 which can be interpreted as a case where
some of the workers act as recruiters and thus χv hours worked are diverted from the
production process to hiring, and in addition κ(v) costs in terms of goods are incurred
for vacancy posting. Each vacancy attracts piv(θ) new workers.
If the firm decides to sell it’s output x in the (p,Q) submarket, where the aggregate
amount of goods being sold is X, then the actual amount of goods for which the firm
will be able to find a customer and sell is given by
xψx(Q,X) =
x
X
ψd(Q,X)
Q
The firm can store goods that are not sold, in an attempt to sell them in the next
period. Let i′ be the amount of goods carried over to the next period, given by
i′ = (1− δi)(1− ψx(Q,X(S)))x
where δi ∈ (0, 1) captures the loss of value due to obsoleteness, the fact that some goods
will not be demanded at all in the future, storage costs, and the fact that services can
not be stored.
As discussed above in section with household’s problem, the firm needs to take
into account the constraint guaranteeing shoppers in the (p,Q) submarket at least the
equilibrium value of search W ∗d (S). Let M(S) denote the value of unit of shares in terms
of utility, then
Wd(S) = Ud(S) + (Uc(S)− pM(S))ψd(Q,X(S))
is the value to the household of the marginal search effort in the (p,Q) submarket.
Finally, let m(S,S′) be the stochastic discount factor used to discount future profits.
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To summarize, the problem that a firm solves is
Ω(k, i, n; S) = max
v,p,Q,i
{
pψx(Q,X(S))x− (1 + τf )w(S)H(S)n+ E
[
m(S,S′)Ω(k′, i′, n′; S′)
]}
(3.3.7)
subject to
W ∗d = Ud(S) + (Uc(S)− pM(S))ψd(Q,X(S))
x = zf(k, nH(S)− χv)− κ(v)− k′ + (1− δk)k + i
i′ = (1− δi)(1− ψx(Q,X(S)))x
n′ = (1− δn)n+ piv(θ(S))v
S′ = G(S)
Government
Government’s budget is assumed to be balanced in each period, thus total tax rev-
enues are equal to total government expenditures
τw
(
nH(S)w(S) + (1− n)p(S)b)+ τfnH(S)w(S) = (1− n)p(S)b+ t(S) (3.3.8)
Equilibrium
Given government’s policy (τw, τf , b) an equilibrium in this economy is defined as
follows.
Definition 3. An equilibrium consists of household’s value function and policy functions
(W, gc, gd, gs
′
); firm’s value and policy functions (Ω, gv, gk
′
, gp, Q); aggregate allocation
(X,C,D, V,H), tightness (Q, θ), prices (p, w), dividends R, transfers t, law of motion
G, all as functions of S; such that
1. (W, gcg,d, gs
′
) are the solution to (3.3.6)
2. (Ω, gv, gk
′
, gp, gQ) are the solution to (3.3.7)
3. Household and firm are representative
4. Wage and hours worked w(S), h(S) solve the Nash bargaining problem (3.3.1)
5. Government’s budget constraint (3.3.8) is satisfied
6. Goods market tightness is Q(S) = 1D(S) ; labor market tightness θ(S) =
V (S)
1−N
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3.4 Equilibrium Characterization
To obtain conditions that determine the dynamics of model I first derive the optimality
conditions for the household and the firm and then use them to obtain the solution for
the Nash bargaining problem. This allows to characterize the behavior of the six main
variables in the model (K, I,N,H,Q, θ).
To avoid the notational clutter in what follows I drop the arguments of functions,
use gA to denote derivative of function g with respect to A, and g
′ to denote value of
function g in the next period. I also use AB for elasticity of A with respect to B.
3.4.1 Household’s Optimality Conditions
From the first order conditions for c and d we get for the value of the marginal unit of
income
λ1 =
1
p
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
and applying the envelope theorem we get the following expression for the marginal
value of a worker employed under a contract with equilibrium hours of work H and
equilibrium wage w
Wn = Un + (1− τw)
(w
p
H − b
)(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
+ (1− δn − piu)βEW ′n (3.4.1)
From the first order conditions for s′ and using envelope theorem for s
λ1 = βE[λ′1(1 +R′)]
Plugging in for λ1 yields the following Euler equation equalizing the cost of increasing
saving by a marginal unit and the return from this marginal savings
1
p
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
= βE
[
(1 +R′)
1
p′
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)]
(3.4.2)
The left hand side corresponds to the utility cost of extra unit of savings: the household
could have instead purchased 1p units of good which require utility cost
Ud
ψd
per unit of
good because of the search friction, and enjoyed Uc extra utility per unit of good. The
right hand side corresponds to the utility benefit of extra unit of savings: the 1 + R
monetary flow in the next period can be used to purchase extra consumption in the
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next period. It will be convenient to denote by M(S) the expected discounted utility
from marginal unit of share holdings
M = βE
[
(1 +R′)
1
p′
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)]
(3.4.3)
The above intertemporal optimality condition thus states that λ1 = M .
3.4.2 Firm’s Optimality Conditions
Since the household is representative adding the full set of Arrow securities would not
affect the allocation, and I can use standard complete markets pricing approach to value
the firm. Thus we have for the stochastic discount factor
m(S,S′) = β
p(S)
p(S′)
Uc(S
′) + Ud(S
′)
ψd(Q(S′))
Uc(S) +
Ud(S)
ψd(Q(S))
(3.4.4)
where, with slight abuse of notation, Uc(S) =
∂
∂cUc(C(S), D(S), N(S), ζ) and similarly
Ud(S) =
∂
∂cUd(C(S), D(S), N(S), ζ).
From the first order condition for Q we get that the equilibrium price of the con-
sumption good satisfies
p = ψ
d
Q
Uc
M
+ (1− ψdQ )(1− δi)E[mΩ′i] (3.4.5)
where ψ
d
Q =
∂ logψd
∂ logψd
, and the value of the marginal unit of inventories satisfies
Ωi = ψ
xp+ (1− ψx)(1− δi)E[mΩ′i] (3.4.6)
Next, applying the envelope theorem for k and combining it with the first order condition
for k′ yields the intertemporal condition for optimal capital accumulation
Ωi = E
[
mΩ′i(z
′f ′k + 1− δk)
]
(3.4.7)
Then, applying the envelope theorem for n and combining it with the first order condi-
tion for v and the price equation (3.4.5) to get for the marginal value of a worker
Ωn =
(
zflH +
1− δn
piv
(χzfl + κv)
)
Ωi − (1 + τf )wH (3.4.8)
Finally, by plugging Ωn into the first order condition for v we obtain the job creation
condition
(χzfl + κv)Ωi = pi
vE
[
m
((
z′f ′lH
′ + (χz′f ′l + κ
′
v)
1− δn
(piv)′
)
Ω′i − (1 + τf )w′H ′
)]
(3.4.9)
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3.4.3 Goods Market and Capital Accumulation
From (3.4.5), combined with (3.4.2) and (3.4.3), after eliminating p and M one can
obtain the following condition
−Ud = (1− ψ
d
Q )ψ
d
[
Uc − (1− δi)βE
[(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)
(Ωri )
′
]]
(3.4.10)
which states that the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of search effort in the
goods market are equalized.
By plugging the expression for the stochastic discount factor (3.4.4) into the opti-
mality condition from firm’s problem (3.4.7) we can derive the following Euler equation
for optimal capital accumulation
Ωri
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
= βE
[
(Ωri )
′(z′f ′k + 1− δk)
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)]
(3.4.11)
Using (3.4.4) and the value of the marginal unit of inventories from firm’s problem, one
can also obtain that in equilibrium
Ωri = ψ
x + (1− ψx)β(1− δi)E
[
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
Uc +
Ud
ψd
(Ωri )
′
]
(3.4.12)
3.4.4 Labor Market and Employment Determination
Under Nash bargaining protocol, wage w and hours worked H are jointly determined
as a solution to the following problem
(w(S), H(S)) = argmax
wˆ,Hˆ
Wˆn(wˆ, Hˆ)
µΩˆn(wˆ, Hˆ)
1−µ
where Wˆn(wˆ, Hˆ) and Ωˆn(wˆ, Hˆ) are values, to household and firm, of a marginal worker
employed under a contract requiring arbitrary hours worked Hˆ at arbitrary wage wˆ in
the current period and equilibrium hours H at equilibrium wage w thereafter, until the
job is hit by the separation shock δn.
By considering a household with n members employed for equilibrium wage w and
working equilibrium hours H, and ν members employed for arbitrary wage wˆ and work-
ing arbitrary hours Hˆ in the current period and equilibrium wage w and equilibrium
hours H thereafter, until the they are hit by the separation shock δn, and taking the
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limit as ν → 0, we can obtain the value of a marginal member of the household employed
for this households
Wˆn(wˆ, Hˆ) = Un(Hˆ)− Un(H) + (1− τw) wˆHˆ − wH
p
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
+Wn (3.4.13)
By considering a firm that employs n workers employed at equilibrium wage w and
equilibrium hours H, and ν workers employed at arbitrary wage wˆ and arbitrary hours
Hˆ in the current period, and equilibrium w and H thereafter, and taking the limit as
ν → 0, we can obtain the value of an extra worker for the firm
Ωˆn(wˆ, Hˆ) = zfl(Hˆ −H)Ωi + (1 + τf )(wH − wˆHˆ) + Ωn (3.4.14)
The Nash bargaining problem is thus
(w(S), H(S)) = argmax
wˆ,Hˆ
Wˆn(wˆ, Hˆ)
µΩˆn(wˆ, Hˆ)
1−µ
subject to (3.4.13) and (3.4.14). The first order condition for w yields a sharing rule
Wn =
µ
1− µ
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
1− τw
1 + τf
Ωn
p
(3.4.15)
or Wnpλ1 = µS where λ1 = 1p
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
is the marginal value of wealth for the household
and S = Ωnp + Wnpλ1 is the total surplus of the match.
From the first order condition for h we get, using the first order condition for w, the
following condition for hours worked
− Un,h = 1− τw
1 + τf
Ωri zfl
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
(3.4.16)
To derive the wage equation first plug Wn from the sharing rule (3.4.15) into (3.4.1),
use stochastic discount factor (3.4.4), and the optimality condition for firm (3.4.8) and
(3.4.9) which after a little bit of algebra yields the equation for wage bill per worker
wH
p
= µ
1
1 + τf
(
zflH + (χzfl + κv)θ
)
Ωri + (1− µ)
(
b− 1
1− τw
Un
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
(3.4.17)
Similarly to other search-matching models with Nash bargaining, wage is a weighted
average of the value of marginal product of a worker enhanced by the vacancy cost
savings, and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
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Finally, to get a stochastic difference equation that characterizes the labor market
plug in for w′ from (3.4.17) into the job creation equation (3.4.9), and use stochastic
discount factor (3.4.4) to get
1
piv
(χzfl + κv)Ω
r
i
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
= βE
[ [
(1− µ)z′f ′lH ′ +
(1− δn
(piv)′
− µθ′
)
(χz′f ′l + κ
′
v)
]
(Ωri )
′
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)
− (1− µ)
[
(1 + τf )b
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)
− 1 + τf
1− τwU
′
n
]]
(3.4.18)
3.4.5 Efficiency
The results so far are summarized by following proposition.
Proposition 6. Equilibrium market tightness (Q, θ) and allocation (H,K, I,N) is given
by the system of equations (3.4.10), (3.4.11), (3.4.12), (3.4.16), (3.4.18), with
N ′ = (1− δn)N + (1−N)piu (3.4.19)
I ′ = (1− δi)(1− ψx)X (3.4.20)
and with (C,X, V,D) eliminated using constraints
C = ψd/Q
X = zf − κ+ (1− δk)K −K ′ + I
V = θ(1−N)
Q = T/D
The first one of the seven equations in Proposition 6 is the optimality conditions
for goods market with competitive search, in which the effect of the search effort by
a consumer on the ability of other participants in the market to trade successfully
is internalized. The second condition is an Euler equation for capital accumulation,
where the left hand side represents the cost of marginal unit of output allocated into
investment, in the form of foregone utility from consumption, and the right hand side is
the benefit of this marginal investment unit in the form of extra utility derived from extra
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consumption in the next period. Utility gain from consumption on both sides is adjusted
for the utility cost incurred due to an increase in search effort needed to purchase these
goods. The next equation characterizes the value of the inventory, which depends on
the ability of the firm to successfully sell it in the current period, and on its depreciated
value when the inventory is not sold in the current period. The fourth condition the
intratemporal optimality conditions for hours worked in equilibrium showing that hours
worked optimally equate the utility cots of an extra hour of work with its benefit, which
is the utility gain from consumption of goods produced and purchased, adjusted for
the utility cost incurred due to extra search needed to purchase these goods. The fifth
equation is the counterpart of the stochastic first order difference equation for labor
market tightness θ in the basic labor search model. This condition equates the cost
of hiring a worker in terms of utility (fewer goods sold and thus also consumed), with
the value of an extra worker hired in terms of utility (increased production and hiring
cost saved which both allow to increase consumption in future, adjusted for the value
of foregone leisure).
The efficient allocation in this economy is defined as an allocation chosen by a social
planner facing the search-matching technological restrictions in the labor and goods
markets
Definition 4. An allocation is efficient if it solves
W(z, ζ,K, I,N) = max
C,D,H,X,V,K′
{
U(C,D,N,H, ζ) + βEW(z′, ζ ′,K ′, I ′, N ′)
}
subject to
C = mG(D,TX)
X = zf(K,NH − χV )− κ(V ) + (1− δk)K −K ′ + I
I ′ = (1− δi)(X −mG(D,TX))
N ′ = (1− δn)N +mL(U, V )
Given this definition of efficiency the following proposition establishes condition
which guarantees the efficiency of the decentralized economy.
Proposition 7. If τw = τf = 0, b = 0 and worker’s bargaining power is µ =
∂ logmL
∂ logU
equilibrium is efficient.
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This proposition thus implies that the existence of the labor market wedge in this
model does not imply inefficiency, as would be the case with wage or price mark-ups
due to monopolistic competition or sticky wages and prices.
3.4.6 Labor Wedge in the Model with Goods and Labor Search
Goods market frictions alter the efficiency wedge, but by comparing equilibrium con-
ditions for the model with labor and goods market search in Proposition 6 with those
for the prototype RBC model in Section 3.2, in particular the intratemporal conditions
for hours worked (3.4.16) and (3.2.3) it is clear that they also affect the labor wedge.
If in expansion the disutility associated with obtaining a marginal unit of consumption
Ud
ψd
falls, or if the marginal value of an inventory Ωri increases, the labor wedge in the
goods and labor market search model will be more procyclical than the labor wedge in
the labor search model from Shimer (2010). To show that this is indeed the case, I now
turn to the quantitative analysis of the business cycle properties of the model.
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
3.5.1 Functional forms
I consider the case with following functional forms for preferences and technology.
Assumption 3.
(A1) Utility of an individual worker is given by
u(c, d, e, h) = ζc log c− ζd d
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− eζn h
1+φ
1 + φ
− (1− e)ζu
(A2) Production function is of Cobb-Douglas form zAf(k, l) = zAk1−λlλ
(A3) Matching functions have constant elasticity of substitution form
mL(U, V ) = B(γU
ν−1
ν + (1− γ)V ν−1ν ) νν−1
mG(AD,TX) =
(
α(AD)
σ−1
σ + (1− α)(TX)σ−1σ ) σσ−1
(A4) Hiring costs are characterized by χ = 1, κ(V ) ≡ 0
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Since preferences are additively separable between consumption, hours worked, and
search effort we immediately get ce = cu = c and de = du = d. The household thus acts
as if it had preferences
U(c, d, n, h, ζ) = log c− ζd d
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− nζn h
1+φ
1 + φ
− (1− n)ζu
The technology is subject to temporary shocks to z and to permanent shocks to the
stochastic trend A, which grows at rate γ′A =
A′
A . To guarantee existence of a balanced
growth path, the permanent component of the technology also increases efficiency of
the search effort by consumers.
The processes for shocks are assumed to be
log ξ′ = (1− ρξ) log ξ¯ + ρξ log ξ + ε′ξ
where ξ ∈ {γA, z, ζd} and εξ ∼ N(0, η2ξ ).
3.5.2 Calibration
One period of the model is one quarter, parameter β is chosen to obtain the annual
interest rate of 5%. I set z¯ to normalize the level of realized consumption C = 1 and
set λ to target the capital share 0.36. Capital output ratio target is 3.2 as in Shimer
(2010), and δk is 0.07. I assume a symmetric goods market matching function with
α = 0.5. Depreciation of inventories is 0.15 for goods and 1 for services, the implied
overall quarterly depreciation of inventories is thus 0.83.
For labor market I follow Shimer (2010) by setting ν = 0, γ = 0.5 which implies a
symmetric Cobb-Douglas matching function. I set the value of unemployment benefits
b to 0.2 of average labor productivity, target quarterly job separation rate δn = 0.1,
quarterly job finding rate piu = 0.733 and steady state unemployment rate U = 0.12.
Silva and Toledo (2009) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue for average costs
associated with recruiting, screening and interviewing needed to hire a new worker
around 4% to 5% of new worker’s quarterly wages paid. Since an hour of recruitment
in the model attracts piv workers, to get one worker 1piv hours of recruitment are needed.
Thus, if w is the wage in the model, the total costs of a hire are 1pivw = 0.065×wH and
so I target piv = 10.065H . I set τw, τf to obtain the steady state measured labor wage
of 0.6, consistent with U.S. data as discussed in Section 3.2. Given the job finding rate
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and recruitment rates targeted, since pi
u
piv = θ and pi
u = Bθ1−γ the matching efficiency
parameter is B = (piu)γ(piv)1−γ = 6.13.
Parameter φ is set to get Frisch elasticity 0.7, and ϕ is to 0. I calibrate ζn so that in
the steady state hours worked are H = 0.3. To set ζu notice that for a given bargaining
power µ, value of home production and leisure ζu affects wage and through that profits
of the firms, hiring, labor tightness θ, and also U . I thus proceed as Shimer (2010), set
µ = γ and calibrate ζu to match the above mentioned target unemployment rate. I set
ζ¯c = 1 and calibrate ζ¯d to normalize the steady state goods market tightness to Q = 1.
3.5.3 Estimation
In order to set the parameters of the processes γA, z and ζd and the elasticity of sub-
stitution for the good market matching function σ, I estimate a log-linearized model to
match observed quarterly time series for the growth rate of the measured productivity
residual γzˆ = ∆ log zˆ, the growth rate of per capita output γY , and the growth rate of
per capita consumption γC . The sample used is 1960Q1-2010Q4, Appendix E describes
the data. Table 3.1 shows the prior distributions for estimation, estimated posterior
mode obtained by maximizing the log of the posterior distribution, the approximate
standard error based on the corresponding Hessian, and also the mean, mode, 10 and
90 percentile of the posterior distribution of the parameters obtained using the random
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with four chains and 500000 draws.
Table 3.1: Estimation of the model with shocks to γA, z, ζd
Prior Posterior
distribution mean st.dev. mode mean 90 % HPD interval
ρd Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9914 0.9893 [0.9821,0.9968]
ρz Beta 0.8 0.1 0.9205 0.9237 [0.8888,0.9591]
ρA Beta 0.6 0.2 0.1440 0.1563 [0.0621,0.2458]
st.dev. εd Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0096 0.0101 [0.0081,0.0121]
st.dev. εz Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0041 0.0043 [0.0036,0.0050]
st.dev. εA Inverse Gamma 0.01 2 0.0060 0.0060 [0.0055,0.0065]
σ Gamma 1 1 0.3378 0.3861 [0.2305,0.5309]
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3.5.4 Simulation
Table 3.2 compares the average standard deviations and correlations of the main vari-
ables in 1000 simulations of the model with their counterparts in U.S. data. All variables
are in logs, HP filtered with parameter λ = 1600. The statistics for labor wedge are
presented for both the representative agent wedge, and for the intensive margin wedge
which allows to distinguish the hours per worker and the employment components. The
representative agent wedge is defined as
RAW =
MRS
MPL
=
ζn(NH)
φ/ 1C
λ¯ YNH
and the intensive margin wedge as
IMW =
MRSH
MPNH
=
NζnH
φ/ 1C
λ¯ YNHN
Thus in the representative margin wedge the marginal rate of substitution of consump-
tion for leisure is based on hours per capita, where as in the intensive margin wedge it
is based on the hours per worker. Similarly, the marginal product in the representative
margin wedge is the marginal product of an hour, where as in the intensive margin
wedge it is marginal product of an hour per worker (see Pescatori & Tasci, 2013 and
Bils et al., 2014 for a further discussion on this distinction).
Table 3.2: Summary statistics, based on 1000 simulations of the model
U.S. data model
st.dev.(·)/st.dev.(Y ) corr(·, Y ) st.dev.(·)/st.dev.(Y ) corr(·, Y )
C 0.81 0.88 0.71 0.79
∆K 3.25 0.93 2.16 0.80
H 0.31 0.79 0.20 0.87
N 0.71 0.83 0.26 0.72
RAW 1.90 0.41 1.01 0.42
IMW 1.05 0.32 0.81 0.22
S 0.90 0.95 0.98 0.99
I 0.86 0.58 0.34 0.76
I/S 0.75 -0.44 0.77 -0.95
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In the simulations, both the representative agent labor wedge and the intensive
margin labor wedge are somewhat less volatile than in the data. Both are however
procyclical, with similar correlation with output as observed in the data.
The historical labor wedge and the smoothed labor wedge obtain in the estimation
are plotted in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. The correlation between the representative
agent labor wedge in the U.S. data and the one recovered in the estimation is 0.497,
for the intensive margin labor wedge this correlation is 0.324. Table 3.3 compares the
cyclical properties of the actual labor wedge in the U.S. data and the labor wedge
recovered in the estimation.
Figure 3.3: Representative margin wedge
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Figure 3.4: Intensive margin wedge
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Table 3.2 also shows that even though both consumption and investment are some-
what less volatile in the model compared to the data, they are not very far away. The
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Table 3.3: Historical vs. smoothed labor wedge
U.S. data model
Standard deviation relative to output
RAW 1.897 1.382
IMW 1.044 1.022
Correlation with output
RAW 0.71 0.69
IMW 0.53 0.51
Elasticity with respect to output
RAW 1.349 0.958
IMW 0.554 0.521
main shortcoming of the model is the implied volatility of employment which is consid-
erably smaller. On the more positive side, even though neither data on inventories nor
data on sales was not used as observables in the estimation, the model can replicate
the countercyclical inventory-sales ratio, procyclical inventories, and sales which are less
volatile than output.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I modify the standard real business cycle model by replacing frictionless
labor and goods markets with markets that require search effort of market participants to
find a match. I use this model to demonstrate that under the business cycle accounting
approach proposed by Chari et al. (2007), search frictions in the goods market manifest
themselves as a labor wedge. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods to match
U.S. Solow residual, output and consumption growth. Both technology and preference
shocks to disutility from search are included in the estimation, to allow for supply and
demand side disturbances. In the estimated model with search frictions in both labor
and goods markets, firms are more likely to sell goods in expansions due to an increase
in demand, and the disutility from search effort required per unit of consumption falls
in expansion. As a result there is a larger response of the intensive margin of labor
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supply and the measured labor wedge resembles a countercyclical tax on labor income.
This is in stark contrast to the model in Shimer (2010) where only labor market is
subject to search frictions, and the labor wedge resembles a counterfactually procyclical
tax on labor income. Since inventories naturally arise in an environment where search
frictions prevent output from being sold immediately, the developed model also provides
a framework to analyze the behavior of inventories and sales. Even though these are
not targeted, the model can successfully match the three main facts from U.S. data
on inventories that have proved to be quite a challenge to explain - sales that are less
volatile than production, inventory investment that are procyclical and inventories-sales
ratio which is countercyclical.
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Appendix A
Household’s optimality conditions
Consider household’s problem (1.2.2). Denoting by λ1, λ2 the Lagrange multipliers on
first two constraints, the first order conditions and the envelope theorem conditions are
c : 0 = Uc − λ1p− λ2
d : 0 = Ud + λ2ψ
d
a′ : 0 = −λ1 + βEW ′a
a : Wa = λ1(1 +R)
n : Wn = Un + λ1w + (1− δ − piu)βEW ′n
From the first order conditions for c and d we get for the value of the marginal unit of
income
λ1 =
1
p
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
and the envelope theorem yields the following expression for the marginal value of a
worker employed under a contract at equilibrium wage w(S)
Wn = Un +
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)w
p
+ (1− δ − piu)βEW ′n (A.1.1)
From the first order condition for a and envelope theorem for a′
λ1 = βE[λ′1(1 +R′)]
Plugging in for λ1 yields the following Euler equation equalizing the cost of increasing
saving in the form of share holdings by a marginal unit and the return from this marginal
savings
1
p
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
= βE
[
(1 +R′)
1
p′
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)]
(A.1.2)
The left hand side corresponds to the utility cost of extra unit of savings: the household
could have instead purchased 1p units of good which require utility cost
Ud
ψd
per unit of
good because of the goods market search friction, and enjoyed Uc extra utility per unit
of good. The right hand side corresponds to the utility benefit of extra unit of savings:
the 1 +R monetary flow in the next period can be used to purchase extra consumption
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in the next period. It will be convenient to denote by M(S) the expected discounted
utility from marginal unit of share holdings
M = βE
[
(1 +R′)
1
p′
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)]
(A.1.3)
The above intertemporal optimality conditions thus states that λ1 = M .
Firm’s optimality conditions
Since the household is representative adding the full set of Arrow securities would not
affect the allocation, and we can use standard complete markets pricing approach to
value the firm. Thus define the stochastic discount factor as
m(S,S′) = β
p(S)
p(S′)
Uc(S
′) + Ud(S
′)
ψd(Q(S′))
Uc(S) +
Ud(S)
ψd(Q(S))
(A.1.4)
where, with slight notational abuse Uc(S) =
∂
∂cU(C(S), D(S), N(S)) and Ud(S) =
∂
∂dU(C(S), D(S), N(S)).
Consider now firm’s problem (1.2.3). After eliminating p, x, n′ using the constraints
the first order conditions and the envelope theorem condition are
Q : 0 =
[(
ψdQ
Q
− ψ
d
Q2
)(
Ud −W ∗d
ψdM
+
Uc
M
)
− ψ
d
Q
Ud −W ∗d
(ψd)2M
ψdQ
]
x
X
v : 0 = − 1
X
ψd
Q
p(χzfl + κv) + pi
vE[mΩ′n]
n : Ωn = −w + 1
X
ψd
Q
pzfl + (1− δ)E[mΩ′n]
Using the first order condition for Q one can obtain that the equilibrium price in active
market satisfies
p = ψ
d
Q
Uc
M
(A.1.5)
where ψ
d
Q =
∂ logψd
∂ logQ . Without goods market search friction price of the good p in the
market would be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
savings; with search friction the price is lower, since this helps the firm to attract more
shoppers and increases the probability of selling the goods.
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Next, applying the envelope theorem and using the first order condition for v to-
gether with (A.1.5) we can obtain the value of a marginal worker to a firm
Ωn =
(
zfl +
1− δ
piv
(χzfl + κv)
)
1
X
ψd
Q
p− w (A.1.6)
Finally, combining (A.1.6) and the first order condition for v yields the job creation
condition
1
X
ψd
Q
p(χzfl + κv) = pi
vE
[
m
((
z′f ′l +
1− δ
(piv)′
(χz′f ′l + κ
′
v)
) 1
X ′
(ψd)′
Q′
p′ − w′
)]
(A.1.7)
Appendix B
Goods market
From (A.1.5) we have M = ψ
d
Q
Uc
p and so noting that the right hand side of equation
(A.1.2) was defined in equation (A.1.3) to be M , we get
− Ud = (1− ψ
d
Q )ψ
dUc (B.1.1)
Labor market
Under Nash bargaining wage w is determined as a solution to the following problem
w(S) = argmax
wˆ
Wˆn(wˆ)
µΩˆn(wˆ)
1−µ
where Wˆn(wˆ) and Ωˆn(wˆ) are values, to household and firm, of a marginal worker em-
ployed under a contract with arbitrary wage wˆ in the current period and equilibrium
wage w thereafter, until the job is hit by the separation shock δ. I start by deriving
these values.
The value function of a household with n members employed and earning equilibrium
wage w, and ν members employed and earning arbitrary wage wˆ in the current period
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and equilibrium wage w thereafter, until the they are hit by the separation shock δ is
W˜ (wˆ, ν; S) = max
c,d,a′
U(c, d, n+ ν, ζ) + βEW (s′, n′; S′)
subject to
p(S)c+ a′ = (1 +R(S))a+ nw(S) + νwˆ
c = dψd(Q(S), X(S))
n′ = (1− δ)(n+ ν) + piu(θ(S))(1− n− ν)
S′ = G(S)
The value of a marginal worker earning wage wˆ for this households can then be obtained
as
Wˆn(wˆ) = W˜ν(wˆ, 0; S) =
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
) wˆ − w
p
+Wn (B.1.2)
where the last part makes use of equation (A.1.1).
The value of a firm that employs n worker for equilibrium wage w, and ν workers
for arbitrary wage wˆ in the current period, and equilibrium wage w thereafter is
Ω˜(wˆ, ν; S) = max
v,p,Q,x
{
x
X(S)
ψd(Q,X(S))
Q
p− w(S)n− wˆν + E[m(S,S′)Ω(n′; S′)]
}
subject to
x = zf(n+ ν − χv)− κ(v)
n′ = (1− δ)(n+ ν) + piv(θ(S))v
W ∗d (S) = Ud(S) + ψ
d(Q,X(S))
(
Uc(S)− pM(S)
)
S′ = G(S)
Application of envelope theorem yields
Ω˜ν = −wˆ + 1
X
ψd
Q
pzfl + (1− δ)E[mΩ′n]
Notice that the first order conditions for Q, v are same as those in Appendix A, and thus
we obtain for the value of a marginal worker that the firm employs and pays arbitrary
wage wˆ in the current period, and equilibrium wage w thereafter
Ωˆn(wˆ) = Ω˜ν(wˆ, 0) =
(
zfl +
1− δ
piv
(χzfl + κv)
)
1
X
ψd
Q
p− wˆ = w − wˆ + Ωn (B.1.3)
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The Nash bargaining problem is thus1
w(S) = argmax
wˆ
Wˆn(wˆ)
µΩˆn(wˆ)
1−µ
with Wˆn(wˆ), Ωˆn(wˆ) given by (B.1.2) and (B.1.3). The first order condition yields a
sharing rule
Wn =
µ
1− µ
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
1
p
Ωn (B.1.4)
or Wnpλ1 = µS where λ1 = 1p
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
is the marginal value of wealth for the household
and S = Ωnp + Wnpλ1 is the total surplus of the match.
To derive the wage equation first plug Wn from the sharing rule (B.1.4) into (A.1.1),
use stochastic discount factor (A.1.4), and the optimality conditions (A.1.7) and (A.1.6)
which after a little bit of algebra yields the stochastic wage equation
w
p
= µ
1
X
ψd
Q
(zfl + θ(χzfl + κv))− (1− µ) Un
Uc +
Ud
ψd
(B.1.5)
Similarly to other search-matching models with Nash bargaining, wage is a weighted
average of the value of marginal product of a worker enhanced by the vacancy cost
savings, and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
Finally, to obtain a stochastic difference equation that characterizes the labor market
plug for w′ from (B.1.5) into job creation condition (A.1.7), and use stochastic discount
factor (A.1.4), to get
1
piv
(χzfl + κv)ψ
x
(
Uc +
Ud
ψd
)
= βE
[[
(1− µ)z′f ′l +
(1− δ
(piv)′
− µθ′
)
(χz′f ′l + κ
′
v)
]
(ψx)′
(
U ′c +
U ′d
(ψd)′
)
+ (1− µ)U ′n
]
(B.1.6)
1 For simplicity, this specification of the wage bargaining problem disregards the impact of losing a
marginal worker on the bargaining position of firm with the remaining workers, see Stole and Zwiebel
(1996).
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Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider the social planner’s problem
W(z, ζ,N) = max
C,D,X,V
{
U(C,D,N, ζ) + βEW(z′, ζ ′, N ′)}
subject to
C = mG(D,X)
X = zf(N − χV )− κ(V )
N ′ = (1− δ)N +mL(1−N,V )
First, by combining the first order conditions for C and D we can obtain the intratem-
poral optimality condition equalizing the cost and the benefit of the marginal search
effort
− UD = mGDUC (C.1.1)
Next, using the first order condition for V and C we get for the marginal value of an
employed worker
WN = UN +
(
zfL +
1− δ −mLU
mLV
(χzfL + κV )
)
mGXUC
and by shifting this one period forward and plugging back into the first order condition
for V we get the following intertemporal optimality condition
mGX(χzfL + κV )UC
= mLV βE
[[
z′f ′L +
1− δ − (mLU )′
(mLV )
′ (χz
′f ′L + κ
′
V )
]
(mGX)
′U ′C + U
′
N
]
(C.1.2)
To summarize, efficient allocation is characterized by (C.1.1), (C.1.2) and constraints
C = mG(D,X)
X = zf(N − χV )− κ(V )
N ′ = (1− δ)N +mL(1−N,V )
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The equilibrium allocation on the other hand satisfies these three constraints and
(B.1.1), (B.1.6). It is easy to verify that since ψ
d
Q =
∂ logψd
∂ logQ , 
piv
θ =
d log piv
d log θ it holds
that
mGD = (1− ψ
d
Q )ψ
d mGX =
1
X
ψdQ m
L
U = −pi
v
θ pi
u mLV = (1 + 
piv
θ )pi
v
so that (C.1.1) can be rewritten as
−UD = (1− ψ
d
Q )ψ
dUC
and thus (C.1.2) becomes
1
piv
(χzfL + κV )ψ
x
(
UC +
UD
ψd
)
= βE
[[
(1 + pi
v
θ )z
′f ′L +
1 + pi
v
θ
1 + (pi
v
θ )
′
(
1− δ
(piv)′
+ (pi
v
θ )
′θ′
)
(χz′f ′L + κ
′
V )
]
× (ψx)′
(
U ′C +
U ′D
(ψd)′
)
+ (1 + pi
v
θ )U
′
N
]
Clearly, if µ = ∂ logm
L
∂ logU = −pi
v
θ these are exactly the same conditions as (B.1.1) and
(B.1.6), and so the conditions for efficient allocation coincide with conditions for equi-
librium allocation.
The following lemma is used throughout in subsequent proofs.
Lemma 2. Suppose that f(x, y) is homogeneous of degree 1 and has elasticity of sub-
stitution σxy. Then σxy =
fxfy
fxyf
.
Proof. Since f has elasticity of substitution σxy
σxy =
1
xfx
+ 1yfy
− fxx
(fx)2
+
2fxy
fxfy
− fyy
(fy)2
thus
fyy + fxx = σxy
[
− xy
[
fxx
fy
fx
+ fyy
fx
fy
]
+ 2fxyxy
]
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Using the fact that f is HOD 1 we have
f = −σxy
[
xy
[
fxx
fy
fx
+ fyy
fx
fy
]
+ fxxx
2 + fyyy
2
]
= −σxy
[
fxx
x
fx
(fxx+ fyy) + fyy
y
fy
(fyy + fxx)
]
= −σxy
[
fxxx
fx
+
fyyy
fy
]
f
Now use the fact that fx and fy are HOD 0 and simplify further to get
1 = −σxy
[−fxyy
fx
+
−fxyx
fy
]
= σxy
fxyf
fxfy
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.
a. First, using y = ψ
d
QN and ψ
d
Q = 
ψd
Q
ψd
Q we have ψ
d
Q = 
ψd
Q Ny, and since under Assump-
tion 2 κ = zκ¯ and X = z(f − κ¯), the goods and labor market equilibrium conditions
(1.3.1) and (1.3.2) become
− UdD = (1− ψ
d
Q )UcC (C.1.3)
1
piv
χfl + κ¯v
f − κ¯ 
ψd
Q NyUc
= βE
[(
(1− µ)f ′l +
(1− δ
(piv)′
− µθ′
)
(χf ′l + κ
′
v)
) 1
f ′ − κ¯′ (
ψd
Q )
′N ′y′U ′c + (1− µ)U ′n
]
(C.1.4)
Consider now any arbitrary history of shocks (zt, ζt) and resulting history of measured
average labor productivity, market tightness and employment (yt, θt, Qt, N t) which sat-
isfy equilibrium conditions (C.1.3), (C.1.4) and the law of motion for labor (1.3.3). Now
let z˜t = 1; because m
G is strictly increasing in both its arguments we can find a unique
Q˜t such that
ψd(Q˜t,
z˜t
zt
Xt)
Q˜t
=
ψd(Qt, Xt)
Qt
(C.1.5)
and set D˜t = 1/Q˜t and X˜t = z˜tf
(
Nt − χθt(1−Nt)
)− z˜tκ¯(θt(1−Nt)). This guarantees
that
Ct = ψ
d(Q˜tX˜t)/Q˜t
yt =
ψd(Q˜t, X˜t)/Q˜t
Nt
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hold. Let ζ˜dt be such that (C.1.3) holds with (Qt, Dt, Xt, ζdt) replaced by (Q˜t, D˜t, X˜t, ζdt),
that is
−Ud
(
Ct, D˜t, Nt, (ζct, ζ˜dt, ζnt)
)
D˜t = (1− ψ
d
Q (Q˜t, X˜t))Uc
(
Ct, D˜t, Nt, (ζct, ζ˜dt, ζnt)
)
Ct
The last equilibrium condition that is left to be verified is (C.1.4). Since by Assumption
1A preferences are additively separable the optimal allocation for household satisfies
ce = cu = c and de = du = d and so
U(c, d, n, ζ) = ζcu(c)− ζdg(d)− ζnn
which implies that
Uc
(
Ct, D˜t, Nt, (ζct, ζ˜dt, ζnt)
)
= Uc
(
Ct, Dt, Nt, (ζct, ζdt, ζnt)
)
(C.1.6)
Un
(
Ct, D˜t, Nt, (ζct, ζ˜dt, ζnt)
)
= Un
(
Ct, Dt, Nt, (ζct, ζdt, ζnt)
)
(C.1.7)
and thus (C.1.4) will hold for ((z˜t, ζ˜t), (yt, θt, Q˜t, N t)) as long as
ψ
d
Q (Q˜t, X˜t) = 
ψd
Q (Qt, Xt) (C.1.8)
It now only remains to be shown that this condition can only be satisfied if ψ
d
Q (Q,X) ≡
const. Since by construction
ψ
d
Q = m
G
Q(1, QX)
Q
mG(1, QX)
= mG(TX)(D,TX)
TX
mG(D,TX)
and X˜t =
z˜t
zt
Xt, condition (C.1.8) is equivalent to
mG(TX)
(
D˜t, T
z˜t
zt
Xt
) T z˜tztXt
mG
(
D˜t, T
z˜t
zt
Xt
) = mG(TX)(Dt, TXt) TXtmG(Dt, TXt)
and since mG is homogeneous of degree 1 and mG(TX) homogeneous of degree 0, this
implies D˜t =
z˜t
zt
Dt. But then (C.1.5) would imply
z˜t
zt
mG(Dt, TXt) = m
G(D˜t, T X˜t) =
ψd(Q˜t,
z˜t
zt
Xt)
Q˜t
=
ψd(Qt, Xt)
Qt
= mG(Dt, TXt)
or z˜t = zt which is a contradiction. Thus (C.1.8) can only be satisfied if matching
function mG is actually such that ψ
d
Q (Q,X) ≡ const.
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b. Since the wage is given by (B.1.5), using (B.1.1), (C.1.5) and (C.1.6)-(C.1.7) we obtain
w
p
= µ
1
X˜
ψ˜d
Q˜
(z˜fl + θ(χz˜fl + z˜κ¯v))− (1− µ) U˜n
ψ
d
Q U˜c
Thus the observed histories of real wages under history of shocks (zt, ζt) and under the
alternative history (z˜t, ζ˜t) are identical only if ψ
d
Q (Q˜t, X˜t) = 
ψd
Q (Qt, Xt) for all t, which
as shown in part a. only holds if ψ
d
Q (Q,X) is actually constant.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Under Assumption 1A with u(c) = log c, since preferences are additively separa-
ble, optimal allocation for household satisfies ce = cu = c, de = du = d and so
U(C,D,N, ζ) = ζc logC − ζdg(D)− ζnN
Then
a. Since mGD = (1− ψ
d
Q )ψ
d the goods market equation (1.3.1) can be written as
0 = mGD(D,TX)UC
(
mG(D,TX), D,N, ζ
)
+ UD
(
mG(D,TX), D,N, ζ
)
where X = zf(N − χV ) − κ(V ). Then, under Assumption 1A with u(c) = log c, this
simplifies to
ζdgDD = ζc
mG
D (C.1.9)
Because
∂m
G
D
∂(TX)
=
mGD,(TX)D
mG
(
1− m
G
Dm
G
TX
mGD,(TX)m
G
)
= − 1
TX
1
σ
m
G
(TX)
mG
D (1− σ)
if the matching function mG has elasticity of substitution σ = 1 then (C.1.9) does not
depend on X, thus the search effort D and consequently also goods market tightness Q
in equilibrium does not react to changes in productivity z.
b. Under Assumption 1A with u(c) = log c labor market equation (1.3.2) becomes
1
X
ψ
d
Q
K
piv
ζc = βE
[[
(1− µ)z′f ′l +
(1− δ
(piv)′
− µθ′
)
K ′
]
1
X ′
(ψ
d
Q )
′ζ ′c + (1− µ)U ′n
]
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whereK = χzfL(N−χθ(1−N))+κV (θ(1−N)) andX = zf(N−χθ(1−N))−κ(θ(1−N)).
Moreover, ζd does not enter the equation above explicitly, so any changes in ζd can only
affect labor market indirectly through changes in Q and ψ
d
Q . Since
ψ
d
Q =
∂mG(1, QX)
∂Q
Q
mG(1, QX)
=
mG(TX)(1, QX)XQ
mG(1, QX)
=
mG(TX)(D,TX)TX
mG(D,TX)
= m
G
(TX)
and
∂m
G
(TX)
∂D
=
mGD,(TX)TX
mG
(
1−
mGDm
G
(TX)
mGD,(TX)m
G
)
= − 1
D
1
σ
m
G
(TX)
mG
D (1− σ)
if the matching function mG has elasticity of substitution σ = 1 then Q does not enter
equation (C.1.10), and thus the labor market tightness θ is unaffected by shocks to the
disutility from search ζd.
c. If Assumption 2 also holds in addition to Assumption 1A, then K = zK¯ and X = zX¯
where K¯ = χfL(N−χθ(1−N))+κ¯V (θ(1−N)) and X¯ = f(N−χθ(1−N))−κ¯(θ(1−N));
thus the labor market equation (C.1.10) simplifies even further and becomes
1
X¯
ψ
d
Q
K¯
piv
ζc = βE
[[
(1− µ)f ′l +
(1− δ
(piv)′
− µθ′
)
K¯ ′
]
1
X¯ ′
(ψ
d
Q )
′ζ ′c + (1− µ)U ′n
]
Since z does not enter this equation explicitly, if the matching function mG has elasticity
of substitution σ = 1 so that using results from parts a. and b. neither Q nor ψ
d
Q react
to changes in productivity z, then labor market tightness θ is also unaffected by shocks
that change the productivity z.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, using y = ψ
d
QN and ψ
d
Q = 
ψd
Q
ψd
Q we have ψ
d
Q = 
ψd
Q Ny, and since under
Assumption 2 κ = zκ¯ and X = z(f − κ¯), it is straightforward to show that the goods
and labor market equilibrium conditions (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) become
0 = (1− ψdQ )UCC + UDD
0 =
(
(1− µ)fL −
(
µθ +
1− β(1− δ)
piv
)
(χfL + κ¯V )
) N
f − κ¯y + (1− µ)
UN
ψ
d
Q UC
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and similarly real wage (1.3.5) can be rewritten as
w
p
= µ(fL + θ(χfL + κ¯V ))
N
f − κ¯y − (1− µ)
UN
ψ
d
Q UC
Note that mGD = (1 − ψ
d
Q )ψ
d and
ψdQ
X = m
G
(TX), thus in the steady (1.3.1) and (1.3.2)
can be also rewritten as
0 = mGDUC + UD
0 = ΛzmG(TX)UC + (1− µ)UN
where Λ = (1− µ)fL −
(
µθ + 1−β(1−δ)βpiv
)
(χfL + κ¯V ).
If we denote Q = (Q, θ)′ and x = (z, ζ)′ we can thus define function G in order to
write the above two conditions as 0 = G(Q,x). Applying Implicit Function Theorem,
we then obtain Q = F(x) and GQdQ = −Gxdx, afterwards using Cramer’s rule we get
θ
GLS
z = −
G1QG
2
z −G2QG1z
G1QG
2
θ −G2QG1θ
z
θ
and then, since G2QdQ+G
2
θdθ +G
2
zdz = 0
Qz = −
G2zz
G2QQ
− G
2
θθ
G2QQ
θ
GLS
z
It is straightforward to verify that
G2z = −(1− µ)
(
1− 
mG
D
σ
+ (1− mGD )MRSCNC
)
UN
z
G2θ = −(1− µ)
(
Λθ −
m
G
D
σ
Xθ + 
MRSCN
C 
mG
TX
X
θ + 
MRSCN
N 
N
θ
)
UN
θ
G2Q = (1− µ)
(
m
G
D
σ
(
1 + σMRSCNC
)
+ MRSCND
)
UN
Q
so that
Qz =
1− m
G
D
σ + (1− m
G
D )
MRSCN
C −
(
− Λθ + 
mG
D
σ 
X
θ − MRSCNC m
G
TX
X
θ − MRSCNN Nθ
)
θ
GLS
z
m
G
D
σ
(
1 + σMRSCNC
)
+ MRSCND
(C.1.11)
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Note that in the model with labor search only, the steady state θ satisfies
0 = G(θ, z) = ΛzUC + (1− µ)UN
and since
Gz = −(1− µ)
(
1 + MRSCNC
)UN
z
Gθ = −(1− µ)
(
Λθ + 
MRSCN
C 
X
θ + 
MRSCN
N 
N
θ
)UN
θ
we get
θ
LS
z = −
Gz
Gθ
=
1 + MRSCNC
−Λθ − MRSCNC Xθ − MRSCNN Nθ
(C.1.12)
Because steady state θ and N are calibrated to be the same in the model with
labor search and the model with goods and labor search, assuming that preferences and
technology are such that the steady state elasticities UCC , 
UC
N , 
UN
C , 
UN
N , 
f
L, 
fL
L are
same in both models, and also µLS = µGLS we can use (C.1.12) to substitute for Λθ into
(C.1.11) to obtain after some rearrangements
1
θLSz
=
(
1− 1
σ
1 + σMRSCNC
1 + MRSCNC
m
G
D (1 + 
Q
z + 
X
θ 
θGLS
z )−
MRSCND
1 + MRSCNC
Qz
)
1
θGLSz
(C.1.13)
Since the model with labor search only measured productivity is given by y = XN thus
y
LS
z = 1 +
(
Xθ − Nθ
)
θ
LS
z (C.1.14)
Similarly, since in the model with goods and labor search y = m
G
N we have
y
GLS
z = 1 +
(
Xθ − Nθ
)
θ
GLS
z − m
G
D
(
1 + Qz + 
X
θ 
θGLS
z
)
(C.1.15)
Because piu, δ and the steady state θ and N are same in both models, we can combine
(C.1.14) and (C.1.15) to obtain
y
GLS
z
θGLSz
=
y
LS
z
θLSz
+
(
1− mGD (1 + Qz + Xθ θ
GLS
z )
) 1
θGLSz
− 1
θLSz
Finally, use (C.1.13) to substitute for 1
θLSz
and get
1
θGLSy
=
1
θLSy
+
1
1 + MRSCNC
(
1− σ
σ
m
G
D 
QX
z + 
MRSCN
D 
Q
z
)
1
θGLSz
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First, note that QXz = 
Q
z + 1 + Xθ 
θ
z and that given G as defined in the proof
of Lemma 1
Qz = −
G1zz
G1QQ
− G
1
θθ
G1QQ
θ
GLS
z
Since
G1z = −
(
1 + σMRSCDC
)1− mGD
σ
UD
z
G1θ = −
((
1 + σMRSCDC
)1− mGD
σ
Xθ + 
MRSCD
N 
N
θ
)
UD
θ
G1Q = −
(
1− mGD
σ
− mGD MRSCDC − MRSCDD
)
UD
Q
we have
Qz =
−1−m
G
D
σ
(
1 + σMRSCDC
)− (1−mGDσ (1 + σMRSCDC )Xθ + MRSCDN Nθ )θGLSz
1−mGD
σ − m
G
D 
MRSCD
C − MRSCDD
and
QXz = −
(MRSCDC + 
MRSCD
D )(1 + 
X
θ 
θGLS
z ) + 
MRSCD
N 
N
θ 
θGLS
z
1−mGD
σ − m
G
D 
MRSCD
C − MRSCDD
Under Assumptions 1A condition (1.3.9) then yields
1
θGLSy
=
1
θLSy
+
1
1 + UCC
1− σ
σ
m
G
D
(−UCC + UDD )(1 + Xθ θ
GLS
z )
1−mGD
σ − m
G
D 
UC
C + 
UD
D
1
θGLSz
Therefore if σ > 1 we have θ
GLS
y > 
θLS
y .
Under Assumptions 1B condition (1.3.9) then yields
1
θGLSy
=
1
θLSy
+
1
1 + UCC
(
1− σ
σ
m
G
D 
gD
D (1 + 
X
θ 
θGLS
z )
1−mGD
σ − m
G
D 
UC
C + 
UD
D
+ UCD 
Q
z
)
1
θGLSz
Therefore θ
GLS
y > 
θLS
y as long as u has relative risk aversion coefficient −UCC ≤ 1 and
σ ≥ 1; or alternatively −UCC ≤ 1 and σ < 1 and gDD is sufficiently small.
89
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Since in the model with goods and labor search y = m
G
N we have
yζd =
(
Xθ − Nθ
)
θ
GLS
ζd
− mGD
(
Qζd + 
X
θ 
θGLS
ζd
)
(C.1.16)
and thus for 1
θGLSy
=
yζd
θ
GLS
ζd
we obtain
1
θGLSy
= −mGD
Qζd
θ
GLS
ζd
+ (1− mGD )Xθ − Nθ
Given function G as defined in the proof of Lemma 1 we get using Cramer’s rule
Qζd
θ
GLS
ζd
=
−G
1
ζd
G2θ−G2ζdG
1
θ
G1QG
2
θ−G2QG1θ
ζd
Q
−G
1
QG
2
ζd
−G1ζdG
2
Q
G1QG
2
θ−G1θG2Q
ζd
θ
= − G
1
ζd
G2θ −G2ζdG1θ
G1ζdG
2
Q −G1QG2ζd
θ
Q
and with additively separable preferences from Assumptions 1A since G2ζd = 0
Qζd
θ
GLS
ζd
=
Λθ − 
mG
D
σ 
X
θ + 
mG
(TX)
UC
C 
X
θ − UNN Nθ
m
G
D
σ (1 + σ
UC
C )
Plugging this back yields
1
θGLSy
=
−Λθ − UCC Xθ + UNN Nθ
1
σ + 
UC
C
+ Xθ − Nθ (C.1.17)
In the model with labor search only with a shock to z we have from (C.1.12) and (C.1.14)
under Assumption 1A that
1
θLSy
=
−Λθ − UCC Xθ + UNN Nθ
1 + UCC
+ Xθ − Nθ (C.1.18)
comparing (C.1.17) and (C.1.18) the result follows immediately.
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Appendix D
Data
Seasonally adjusted average output per worker in nonfarm business sector y, and sea-
sonally adjusted output in the nonfarm business sector Y are both constructed by the
BLS using National Income and Product Accounts and Current Employment Survey,
they are series PRS85006163 and PRS85006043 respectively.
Seasonally adjusted composite help wanted index V is constructed following the
approach in Barnichon (2010) and combines help-wanted advertising index and the
online help-wanted index constructed by Conference Board. Seasonally adjusted un-
employment U is constructed by BLS from Current Population Survey, it’s the series
LNS13000000. Both V and U are quarterly averages of monthly series.
In simulations, quarterly average labor productivity yt is calculated as quarterly
output Yt divided by the quarter’s employment Nt, with quarterly output given by the
sum of weekly output, and quarterly employment given by the average employment in
the three months of the quarter. Since for each month employment is measured by the
BLS in the second week quarterly productivity is calculated as
yt =
∑12
i=1 Y
W
12t−i+1
1
3(N
W
12t−2 +NW12t−6 +NW12t−10)
The ratio of inventories to sales ι is constructed using data for real nonfarm invento-
ries and real final sales of domestic business from BEA, from Table 5.8.6 of the National
Income and Product Accounts.
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Log-linearized model
Let xˆ = log(x/x¯) denote the percentage deviation of variable x from its steady state x¯.
The log-linearized system of equations for (θ,Q,Ωri , I,N, y, ι) is
1
p¯iv
(
− pˆiv + zˆ + fˆl + Ωˆri + ¯ψ
d
Q + Uˆc
)
= βE
[
− µθ¯θˆ′ − 1− δ
p¯iv
(pˆiv)′ +
(
1− µ− µθ¯ + 1− δ
p¯iv
)(
zˆ′ + fˆ ′l + (Ωˆ
R
i )
′ + (ˆψ
d
Q )
′ + Uˆ ′c
)
−
(
1− µ− µθ¯ − 1− β(1− δ)
βp¯iv
)
1
b¯ψ
d
Q U¯c − U¯n
(
b¯ψ
d
Q U¯c(ˆ
ψd
Q + Uˆ
′
c)− U¯nUˆ ′n
)]
Uˆd = ψˆ
d − ¯
ψd
Q
1− ¯ψdQ
ˆψ
d
Q +
1
U¯c − (1− δi)β
(
U¯c +
U¯d
ψ¯d
)
Ω¯ri
×
[
U¯cUˆc − (1− δi)βΩ¯riE
[
U¯cUˆ
′
c +
U¯d
ψ¯d
(Uˆ ′d − (ψˆd)′) +
(
U¯c +
U¯d
ψ¯d
)
(Ωˆri )
′
]]
Ωˆri = (1− β(1− δi))ψˆx + (1− ψ¯x)β(1− δi)E
[
(ˆψ
d
Q )
′ + Uˆ ′c − ˆψ
d
Q − Uˆc + (Ωri )′
]
Iˆ ′ = −ψ¯x/(1− ψ¯x)ψˆx + Xˆ
Nˆ ′ =
(
1− δ/(1− N¯))Nˆ + δ(θˆ + pˆiv)
yˆ = Yˆ − Nˆ
ιˆ = −1/(1− ψ¯x)ψˆx
where (Yˆ , Cˆ, Xˆ, Fˆ ) are given by
Yˆ = Cˆ + (1− δi)1− ψ¯
x
ψ¯x
(Iˆ ′ − Iˆ)
Cˆ = ψˆx + Xˆ
Xˆ =
(
1− (1− δi)(1− ψ¯x)
)
Fˆ + (1− δi)(1− ψ¯x)Iˆ
Fˆ = zˆ +
λ
N¯ − θ¯(1− N¯)((1 + θ¯)N¯Nˆ − (1− N¯)θ¯θˆ)
and in addition, given the choice of the functional forms
Uˆc = ζˆc − ηCˆ Uˆd = ζˆd Uˆn = ζˆn
pˆiv = −γθˆ
ψˆx = − α(Q¯X¯)
ρ
α(Q¯X¯)ρ + 1− α(Qˆ+ Xˆ) ˆ
ψd
Q = −
α(Q¯X¯)ρ
α(Q¯X¯)ρ + 1− αρ(Qˆ+ Xˆ)
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Appendix E
Data sources
Time series used in this paper were retrieved from the following sources:
1. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) www.bea.gov
2. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) www.bls.gov
3. NBER Macrohistory database (NBER) www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents
4. Employment and Earnings data compiled by Cociuba, Prescott, and Ueberfeldt
(2012)
In particular, following data was obtained.
National Income and Product Accounts (BEA:NIPA)
1. Table 1.7.5: Gross National Product GNPt, Consumption of Fixed Capital DEPt
2. Table 1.12: Compensation of Employees CEt, Rental Income RIt, Corporate Prof-
its CPt, Net Interests NIt, Current Surplus of Government Enterprises GEt
3. Table 1.1.4: Price Index for Gross Domestic Product pGDPt
Fixed Assets Accounts Tables (BEA:FAA)
1. Table 1.1: Current Cost Net Private Fixed Assets K2005
2. Table 1.2: Chain-Type Quantity Index for Private Fixed Assets qiKt
Current Population Survey (BLS:CPS)
1. Civilian Noninstitutional Population, age 16 and more P16t: Series ID LNU00000000
2. Civilian noninstitutional population, 65 years and over P65t: Series ID LNU00000097
3. Employment Et: Series ID LNU02005053
4. Average Weekly Hours AWHt: Series ID LNU02005054
NBER Income and Employment (NBER:IE)
1. Average Weekly Hours AWHt: Series m08354
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Cociuba et al. (2012) (CPU)
1. Employment Et
2. Average Weekly Hours AWHt
Constructed time series
Labor share: obtained by constructing following time series
λt = 1− RIt + CPt +NIt +GEt +DEPt
CEt +RIt + CPt +NIt +GEt +DEPt
See R´ıos-Rull and Santaeullia-Llopis (2010) for more details.
Hours: monthly time series for employment Et and average weekly hours AWHt were
compiled from BLS:CPS, NBER:IE, and CPU sources described above, and were season-
ally adjusted using Census X-12 Arima procedure with Easter and Labor day dummies.
Then, quarterly averages were constructed, and total hours and hours per person of age
16-64 were obtained using THt = EtAWHt and Ht = THt/(P16t−P64t). Finally total
hours were annualized and hours per person were expressed relative to 100 hours per
week.
Real Capital Kt: obtained by multiplying the chain-type quantity index from BEA:FAA
Table 1.2 by the current-cost net stock in 2005 from BEA:FAA Table 1.1, and interpo-
lated to obtain quarterly time series.
Productivity residual: obtained by first taking a logarithm of GNP, real capital and
total hours worked, then linearly detrending these time series and finally calculating
log zˆt = y˜t − (1− λ¯)k˜t − λ¯t˜ht
where λ¯ is the average labor share, and for any variable Xt x˜t = logXt − aX − bXt is
the residual from the linear detrending procedure.
